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SITUATION

II

NEUTRALITY AND TERRITORIAL WATERS
States X and Y are at war. Other states are neutral.
State R has forbidden submarines to enter its territorial
'vaters, except in case of distress; or to pass through its
straits and archipelagoes, except on the surface and under the condition that no belligerent activities take place
'vithin such areas.
(a) An air reconnaissance is being maintained ahead
of a part of the fleet of X, which, in passing through a
strait, bet,veen an islet and State R, 6 miles wide at either
entrance but wider in the middle, sights on the surface a
submarine of Y on the landward side of the islet, but
3Yz 1niles from land in a favorable position to attack the
vessels of X. ( 1) Should the aircraft attack the subnlarine ~
(2) vVould the situation be changed if a
cruiser of State R is near~
(b) The land of R consists of large islands, separated
by wide channels or sounds whose shores are all under the
jurisdiction of R. These channels or sounds contain
nu1nerous relatively small islands, islets, and barrier
reefs, inclosing, in places, large areas of navigable waters. Some of the entrances are narrow and navigable.
Some are wide, and not safely navigable due to sand
bars, reefs, and shoals.
At a point 7 miles from any land of R, the vessels of
X refuel from a commercial tanker of State X. From
this area the only navigable channels are between islands
belonging to R not more than 6 miles a part. An aircraft
of Y sees this refueling and demands that all the vessels
concerned be interned.
What action should be taken?
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SOLUTION

(a) ( 1) The aircraft o£ X should not attack the submarine o£ Y unless on grounds other than mere presence o£ the submarine in the strait o£ R.
(2) The presence o£ the cruiser o£ State R would
make it more imperative that any attack by the aircraft
o£ X upon the submarine o£ Y should be based upon
some hostile act o£ the submarine o£ Y.
~ (b) State R should intern the vessels o£ State X i£
they are or have been using the waters o£ R as a base.
Historical bays.-During the seventeenth century there
were many differences o£ opinion upon the subject. o£
the lin1its o£ maritime jurisdiction. Extreme claims
were made by some states and denied by others. The
claims later made by the United States were not always
consistent, save that a minimu1n o£ 3 miles has always
been maintained.
States have, however, generally maintained that jurisdiction beyond the 3-mile limit might be exercised £or
specific purposes as fishing, revenue purposes, etc.
Admiral Sperry's attitude, 1907.-Admiral Sperry, a
former president o£ this Naval War College, and delegate plenipotentiary to the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 as member o£ the committee o£ examination
upon the convention on the laying o£ automatic contact mines, when the question o£ the extent o£ territorial
waters within which mines might be laid was under
consideration, explained that the American proposal had
a voided mentioning any limit on area. He said:

L

The omission in the proposal of the delegation of the United
States of America relative to submarine mines of a definite restriction on the places where they may be laid is not due to any
sympathy whatever with the general use of n1ines beyond territorial waters, a means which in common with the whole civilized
world it condemns, but for quite other considerations.
The term territorial waters is perhaps no more certain in its
application than measured limits; but the naval delegate of the
United States is not prepared to say that a limitation in one way
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or another would not affect the right to defend the 4,000 miles
of continental coast of the United States at certain points which
must be approached through a winding channel between submerged reefs, far from the shore, where some mines would absolutely prevent access. In one island of the Philippines that is
surrounded by reefs there is a large bay with land on all sides,
which would shelter the fleet of the greatest Power.
The Powers that are here represented have vast rich possessions
in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, where the harbours and islands
are protected by coral reef barriers, with only here and there a
passage that may or may not be less than 10 or even a hundred
miles from the mainland.
The reefs may or may not be exposed at low tide. Where is
the low-water mark? Has it been decided that all waters inside
of reefs are territorial waters? Shall the 3 miles be measured
from the reefs and beyond? The coast of Australia is fringed
for more than a thousand miles by the Great Barrier Reef at a
distance of from 20 to 150 miles from the shore. Inside this reef,
where there is only an occasional passage, there exists a labryinth
of lesser reefs and islets, but in the thousand miles the largest
vessels can navigate in security under the guidance of a pilot.
It is not necessary for a ship going to an Australian port to pass
inside, and the interior waters can hardly be considered as forming a part of the high seas. It is not within the knowledge of the
delegate of the United States whether they are so considered; but
it seems doubtful that the nationals of that great and rich community would voluntarily abandon \Vhat might be almost a perfect defence of important l}()ints.
·
Many Powers represented here have vast colonial empires
whose coasts are protected by almost perfect ramparts of coral,
as all naval officers know, and it would be well to consider with
care the possible effects of any conventional provision that we
might agree upon, and that when once made would be difficult to
denounce. (Reports to The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907,
1917, pp. 664-665.)

The committee of examination adhered to the 3-mile
limit but the commission omitted the articles which referred to limits of area and these articles were not inserted in the convention.
Ouba.-Around some parts of Cuba there are reefs,
rocks, and keys and about the 1:9iddle of the nineteenth
century Spain made claims to extended jurisdiction

36

NEUTRALITY AND TERRITORIAL WATERS

along the Cuban coast. These claims gave rise to much
correspondence between the United States and Spain.
Secretary Seward in 1863 referring to the Spanish
claim of a 6-mile coast jurisdictionAand the argument
based on the nature of the outlying islets, etc., said:
This ground is, that the shore of Cuba is, by reason of its
islets and smaller rocks, such as to require that the maritime
jurisdiction of Cuba, in order to purposes of effective defense,
and police, should be extended to the breadth of 6 miles. The
undersigned has examined what are supposed to be accurate
charts of the coast of Cuba, and if he is not n1isled by some
error of the chart, or of the process of examination, he has
ascertained that nearly half of the coast of Cuba is practically
free from reefs, rocks, and keys, and that the seas adjacent
to that part of the island which includes the great harbors of
Cabanos, Havana, Matanzas, and Santiago are very deep, while
in fact the greatest depth of the passage between Cuba and
Florida is found within 5 miles of the coast of Cuba, off the harbor of Havana.
The undersigned has further ascertained, as he thinks, that
the line of keys which confront other portions of the Cuban
coast resemble, in dimensions, constitution and vicinity to the
mainland, the keys which lie off the southern Florida coast
of the United States. The undersigned assumes that this line
of keys is properly to be regarded as the exterior coast ,line,
and that the inland jurisdiction ceases there, while the maritime jurisdiction of Spain begins from the exterior sea front of
those keys.
In view of the considerations and facts which have been
thus presented, the undersigned is obliged to state that the
Government of the United States is not prepared to admit that
the jurisdiction of Spain in the waters which surround the
island of Cuba lawfully and rightly extends beyond the customary
limit of 3 miles. (1 Moore, International Law Digest, p. 711.)

In 1869, Secretary Fish in a note to the Secretary of
the Navy said:
The maritime jurisdiction of Spain may be acknowledged to
extend not only to a marine league beyond the coast of Cuba
itself, but also to the same distance from the coast line of
the several islets or keys with 'vhich Cuba itself is surrounded.
Any acts of Spanish authority within that line can not be called
into question, provided they shall not be at variance with law
or treaties. (Ibid., p. 713.)

SCANDINAVIAN COASTS

37

The Spanish claim to a 6-mile jurisdiction around the
coast of Cuba was involved in the discussion in 1864 between the British charge and Mr. Seward as to an
international agree1nent for a 6-mile limit but no action
\Vas taken.
Sweden.-The coast of S\veden both within its former and present limits has given rise to many questions
of jurisdiction. 'fhe islands off the Swedish coast inclose \Vaters of varying widths. Whether the waters
land \Yard of son1e of these coast islands or inclosed by
some of these islands should be regarded as closed sea
has been a matter of difference of opinion. Swedish
legislation has sometimes referred ·to certain of these
islands as archipelagoes bounding closed seas. The decree of December 20, 1912, speaking of Swedish inner
territorial \Vaters referred to \Vaters between or within
islands, islets, or reefs not continually submerged. Manifestly this is not sufficiently explicit for all cases \vhich
may arise off the coast of Sweden as some islands are a
long distance from the coast, but the purpose of the
legislation see1ned to be roughly to assimilate the jurisdiction over \Vaters within archipelagoes to \Vaters \vithin
bays.
Scandinavian decrees.-Denmark, Norway, and
Sweden agreed upon rules for neutrality in 1912 (1917,
Naval vVar College, International La,v Documents, p.
183) and provided that changes of the rules should be
n1ade only after sufficient notice to permit an exchange
of vie\vs on the matter.
A S\vedish decree of July 19, 1916, provided thatSubmarines belonging to foreign powers and equipped for use
in warfare may not navigate or lie in Swedish territorial waters
within 3 nautical minutes (5,556 meters) from land or from
extreme outlying skerries, which are not continuously washed
over by the sea, under peril of being attacked by arn1ed force
without previous warning; exception is, however, made for the
passage through Oresund between parallels of latitude drawn
in the north, through Viking Light (lat., north 56° 8' 7"), and,
in the south, through IGagshamm Light (lat., north 55° 31' 2'').
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In the event of a submarine being compelled through ba<l
\veather or shjp\vreck to enter the forbidden area, the above regulation is not applicable, always provided that the vessel while
within the mentioned area, shall remain above the surface and
fly its national flag as \Yell as the international signal indicating
the cause of its presence. The vessel shall leave the area as soon
as possible after the reason for its presence there has ceased
to exist. (Ibid., p. 215.)

The British authorities saw in this Swedish decree
an evidence of a marked difference in the attitude
adopted " towards the two belligerent parties and this
difference seems incompatible with the obligations of a
true and impartial neutrality." (Parliamentary Papers,
Misc. No. 8 (1917), p. 3.) The Swedish authorities resented this imputation saying "every submarine is
treated as a belligerent submarine unless its employment for commercial purposes is definitely proved by
known facts." (Ibid., p. 4.) Further notes were exchanged as was customary at this period of the war.
Instructions and regulations prior t·o 1914.-Before
the World War instructions, regulations, and decrees
had been issued in regard to the use of territorial vvaters
and aerial space. France by decree of October 19, 1912,
provided for the application of XIII Hague Convention of 1907 that the territorial waters of France 1nay
be considered to extend 6 miles from the lovv-water 1nark
as a zone of neutrality and the Minister of Marine on
December 19, 1912, stated that territorial waters of neutrals should never be considered to extend less than 3
miles from the coast or islands or reefs dependent on
the coasts. Italy by a decree of August 20, 1909, announced that in case of war it vvould establish a 10-mile
neutrality zone. Other decrees and proclamations contained varying provisions as to mariti1ne jurisdiction.
Norwegian territorial waters.-By a royal decree of
June 29, 1911, a commission of three was named to 1nake
an investigation in regard to the maritime frontier of
Finmarken. In its report the co1nmission referred to
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the letters patent o:f February 25, 1812, 1n 'vhich the
king had said:
N ous voulons a voir stipule com me regle dans to us les cas oil
il est question de delimitation de la frontiere de notre souver·
ainete sur les eaux territoriales, que celle-ci doit etre comptee
jusqu'a la distance d'une lieue marine ordinaire de l'ile ou l'ilot
le plus eloigne de la terre qui n'est pas recouvert par la mer.
(Rapport du 29 Fevrier 1912 de la Commission da la Frontiere
Des Ea ux Territoriales. Pt. I, 1912, p. 3.)

N or,vay also enacted 1nany la,vs regulating fisheries
within a league o:f the coast or coastal lands covered by
the sea.

* * * sur les mers baignant les tCotes des deux provinces
jusqu'a la distance d'une lieue geographique de la terre, a compter
de l'ile ou l'ilot le plus eloigne que ne soit pas recouvert par la
mer ; (Ibid., p. 3.)
This regulation of the distance had existed long before
the union o:f Norway and Sweden, and in earlier days
during the union 'vith Denmark wider areas had also
been claimed. Such claims had also been made at other
times.
The 'vaters along the coast and about the islands o:f
Norway afford examples o:f the varied geographical configurations and conditions but the expression determining
the limit o:f territorial jurisdiction was often " a league
:from the coast reckoned :from an island or islet which is
most remote and not covered by the sea." While there
'vas not much difficulty in identifying island, islet, and
rock, there was some difficulty in interpreting " qui ne
sont pas reconverts par le mer ". Questions arose as to
'vhether this should be interpreted as exposed at high
tide, exposed at low tide, at mean low tide, or sometimes
exposed. The drift o:f opinion seems to have been :for
Scandinavian coasts that any rock or reef not constantly
submerged would be regarded as the territory o:f the
state :from which the limit o:f territorial waters should be
measured.
In 1919 the United States Government issued a volume entitled "The Extent of the Marginal Sea" pre-
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pared by Henry G. Crocker. This volume contained a
translation o£ so1ne o£ the Report o£ the N or,vegian
Commission, in part as £ollo,vs:
In the opinion of the present Com1nission, the terms of the
letters patent admit of only one certain solution, which is that
rocks 'vhich are always under water must not be taken into
consideration in any case. But the words in thernselves n1ay
mean " which are never under water," " which are not usually
under water," "which are not generally under water," "which
are not continually under water," "which are not under water
all the time," and according to any of these and mauy other interpretations; they may be used in the se!lse of high and low
tide, at ordinary times or at the tin1e of spring tides, or in the
~ense of the mean sea level so as to include or exclude rocks
of a totally different character from those that are under water
at high tide at the time of spring tides to those which at such
times are above water at low tide.
There being no indication in the wording of the text itself,
the most equitable method is for the Commission to draw its
own conclusions based upon the following consiclera tions: the
rescript of June 18, 1745, where the term "shoals" (hauts-fonds)
appears alongside of the term " rocks," leads to the belief that
the boundary line is to be nwasured from the rocks which are
not continually under water, and subsequent rescripts certainly
did not have in view any modification in this respect; construed
in this way, the different rescripts relating to the one league
boundary line lay the minimum of restriction upon the old claim
of a more extensive boundary. If the expressions used in the
letters patent, which· carne later, are equivocal, they must preferably be given the meaning which agrees with the old right,
and the words "which are not under water" must be interpreted as excluding rocks which are always under water. * * *
It n1ay be asked whether we should take into consideration any
rock at all, whatever its distance frmn shore and place the
boundary line of our territorial waters one league beyond it. The
letters patent lay down no restrictions, neither can an order of
this nature-it does not attempt to trace the boundary line in all
its details along the coast-undertake to give exact indications ou
this subject.
It would seem, howeYer, to be equitable to take into account, in
any event, rocks that are not more than two geographical leagues
distant. If a circle with a one league radius be drawn around
such a rock (the width fixed upon for the territorial sea), this
circle will touch a line drawn the same distance from the coast.
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It may also happen-and this is indeed the case with our
country-that there are certain rocks strung out from shore and
so closely connected therewith that the boundary line must Inanifestly be placed one league beyond the farthest out, as the letters
patent proYhle.
If there is an isolated rock at a greater distance than two
leagues fro1n land, its importance must of course be determined
according to the circumstances.
If it should be necessary to lay down in principle what rocks
along the coast are to be considered as "the farthest out," the
method most in conformity \Vith the terms of the letters patent
of 1812-which make the boundary line pass beyond the most
distant islands and islets and do not even mention the coast
line of the mainland-would be to consider as Norwegian the
entire area of the sea between these rocks and the shore and to
extend the boundary line of the territorial \Vaters one league
beyond the straight lines drawn from rock to rock. If the provision of the law gives any indication, it would seem to be that
its intention is to consider the islands and islets as so many
connecting points of the basic lines. In this \vay we obviate
in general the necessity of drawing the boundary line in the
shape of an arc beyond the rocks (or in the shape of semicircles
around them with a one league radius), as well as of drawing
a complete circle around a particular rock which is given a parcel
of territorial sea separate from the rest of the zone.
How far apart, however, should two of " the most distant "
rocks be to admit of the drawing of such a connecting line, from
which the boundary of the territorial \Vaters shall be measured?
Lines should be drawn, at any rate between rocks that are not
nwre than two leagues apart). but it will be necessary to consider the particular circumstances in each instance.
'Ve must pu1·sue the same course when it is a question of
determining the boundary line off the coast where the " skjaergaard " begins and .whe1·e the coast assumes the character of a
fjord at whose entrance there are rocks.
The various circumstances to be taken into consideration in
each particular instance may be of a historical, an economic or
a geographical nature; for example, a time-honored conception
with regard to the boundary, and undisturbed possession of
fisheries carried on by the population along the coast since time
immemorial and necessary to its existence; the practical ad-.
vantages of a line easy to ascertain on the spot ; the natural
boundaries of fishing banks. ( 01·ocker, The Extent of the
l\larginal Sea. 1919, pp. 613-616.)
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Differing neutrality rules .-Neutrality proclamations
are not uniform. One state may even prescribe more
stringent regulations for one part of its dominions than
for another part. The geography and other conditions
may influence the character of the regulations, i. e., a
state may prescribe certain regulations for its mainland while making different regulations for its remote
dependencies. The Netherlands announced in 1914 more
stringent regulations for entrance to its continental territorial waters by belligerent vessels of war than for
such entrance to the waters of its oversea possessions.
Owing to the comparatively recent use of the air by
aircraft, the rules are less well established than for territorial waters. Uncertainty as to the possible use of the
air by belligerents during the World War led neutrals
to enunciate rules that may have been more extreme than
neutrality requires. This seems to have been true in regard to submarines when the rules proposed by the
Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament,
1921-22, are compared with those adopted by the London Conference in 1930.
It may; therefore, be open to question whether the
dirigible belonging to a belligerent air force should be
subject to special restrictions in a neutral airport to
any greater degree than a belligerent cruiser in a maritime port. It is true that there has always been a tendency to put special restrictions upon novel means of warfare. It may, however, not be any more logical to retrict aircraft specially because of speed or the use of
the air than specially to restrict fast cruisers or submarines on account of speed or use of novel methods of
navigation. The hydroplane may be part of the time
upon the surface of the water and part of the time above
and the submarine may similarly be on and below the
surface.
It is true that the Commission of Experts in 1923
drew up regulations at The Hague placing special disa-
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bilities upon aircraft by stringent li1nitations in tin1e of
war. The feeling at that ti1ne was still influenced by
events of the 'Vorld "\Var and aircraft were not so widely
and generally used as in later years. I~ 1899 the discharge of projectiles and explosives from aircraft for a
period of five years was prohibited by a declaration
drawn up at The Hague and this declaration was generally ratified. A declaration in 1907 to like effect to
extend to the close of the Third Peace Conference, proposed for but not held in 1915, was not even signed by
some of the leading states.
rrhe Hague regulations of 1923 have not been ratified
and probably " rould require extended modification to
1neet present conditions. Aircraft are much more comInonly used than in 1923. Regular routes are establish·~d.
~1ails are regularly dispatched by aircraft. Passengers
rely on air service to reach their destinations on time.
If there are to be neutrals in time of war, their rights
should be entitled to respect and neutrals should be entitled to communicate with the belligerents in the customary manner save they must not be of either party in the
war.
S peoial provisions .-vVhile there is a general support
of the 3-mile limit of jurisdiction over the marginal sea
at the present time, there are many states which claim
wider jurisdiction. Some states make these wider claims
on grounds of long practice, some on geographical configura~ion and others on special national grounds. The
United States has negotiated a large nu1nber of treaties
regarding the suppression of the traffic in alcoholic
liquors in which there are expressions showing that the
parties intend " to uphold the principle that 3 marine
miles extending from the coastline outwards and measured from low-water mark constitute the proper limits
of territorial waters." Some states have negotiated such
treaties with. the proviso that "The High Contracting
Parties respectively retain their rights and claims, with138120-32-4
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out prejudice by reason o:f this agreement, with respect
to the extent o:f their territorial jurisdiction." Frane~,
vvhich has such a proviso, has maintained that it vvould
be difficult to reach an agreement on the breadth o:f territorial vvaters saying :
The political, economic and social interests of coastal States
are not only different, but often conflicting, on account of the
position and geographical configuration of the territory and coasts
of those States. (Conference for the Codification of International
Law, Vol. II, Territorial 'Vaters, League of Nations, C. 74, l\1.
39, 1929, v' p. 28.)

The "Anna,," 1805.-An early case showed the soundness o:f Sir William Scott's (Lord Sto-well) reasoning
even when considering a :foreign state. In the case o:f
the Anna, 1805, he said:
The capture was made, it seems, at the mouth of the Mississippi, and, as it is contended in the claim, within the boundaries
of the United States. We all know that the rule of law on this
subject is "terrae dominium finitur, ubi finitur arntorum vis,"
and since the introduction of firearms, that distance has usually
been recognjzed to be about 3 miles from the shore. But it so
happens in this case, that a question arises as to what is to be
deemed the shore, since there are a nutnber of little mud islands
composed of earth and trees drifted down by the River, which
form a kind of portico to the main land. It is contended that
these are not to be considered as any part of the terri tory of
America, that they are a sort of " no mans land," not of consistency enough to support the purposes of life, uninhabited and
resorted to, only, for shooting and taking birds nests. It is
argued that the line of territory isI to be taken only from the
Balise, which is a fort raised on made land by the· former
Spanish possessors. I am of a different opinion; I think that
the protection of territory is to be reckoned from these islands;
and that they are the natural apendages of · the coast on
which they border, and from which indeed they are formed,
Their elements are derived ilnmecliately from the territory, and
on the principle of alluvium and incren1ent, on \Vhich so much
is to be found in the books of law, Quod vis ftuntinis de tuo
praedia detraxerit, a Vicino praed,io attulerit, palam tUU111
r eman et, even if it had been carried over to an adjoining ter-

ritory. Consider what the consequence would •be if lands of
this description were not considered as appendant to the main-
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land, and as comprized within the bounds of territory·. If they
do not belong to the United States of America, any other power
might occupy them; they might be embanked and fortified.
'Vhat a thorn would this be in the side of America! It is physically possible at least that they might be so occupied by European
nations, and then the command of the River would be no longer
in America, but in such settlements. The possibility of such a
consequence is enough to expose the fallacy of any arguments
that are addressed to shew, that these islands are not to be considered as part of the territory of America. 'Vhether they are
eomposed of earth or solid rock, will not Yary the right of dominion, for the right of dominion does not depend upon the
texture of the soil.
I am of opinion that the right of territory is to be reckoned
from those islands. That being established, it is not denied
that the actual capture took place within the distance of 3 miles
from the islands, and at the very threshold of the river. (5 C.
Robinson, Admiralty Report, pp. 373, 385b.)

British position, 192.1;.-In reply to the questionnaire
sent out by the League of Nations preparatory to the
Conference for the Codification of International Law
differing replies were received. As to the breadth of
territorial waters, Great Britain, saying that the British Govern1nent made no claim to exercise jurisdiction
beyond the 3-mile limit, nevertheless, stated:
·
There are certain banks outside the 3-mile limit off the coasts
of various British dependencies on whicll sedentary fisheries
of oysters, pearl oysters, chanks or beches de mer on the sea
bottom are practised, and which have by long usage come to be
regarded as the subject of occupation and property. The foregoing answer is not intended to exclude claims to the sedentary
fisheries on these banks. The question is understood to relate
only to claims to exercise rights over the waters of the high seas.
(d) Claims by foreign States to exercise rights of jurisdiction
or reontrol over the waters of the high seas adjacent to the belt
of territorial 'vaters of those States have never been admitted
and have always been objected to by His Majesty's Government
in Great Britain.
His l\Iajesty's Government admit that the speed of 1nodern
vessels and aircraft and the immense range and power of modern implements of warfare may render a belt of 3 miles insufficient to prevent injurious consequences resulting in the national
territory from acts which have taken place on the high seas,
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but this affords no sufficient argument for a change in the 3-mile
limit. To ensure that no injurious consequence should result
'vithin the national territory from an act which has taken place
on the high seas, it would be necessary to establish a belt so
wide as to constitute a serious encroachment on the high seas.
A belt of such width would lead to perpetual disputes. The
difficulty of determining with accuracy ·whether a vessel is
\vithin the coastal belt would be increased very largely if the
width of that belt were increased, as the greater the distance
from the shore the more difficult it is to fix by reference to the
shore the exact position of the vessel. Furthermore, the burden
imposed on neutral States in time of war would be intolerable.
His Majesty's Government accept the view that no State can be
expecled to tolerate 'vith equanimity circumstances arising under which, owing to peculiar local circumstances, the absen<;e of
jurisdiction over foreign vessels on the high seas immediately
contiguous to its territorial waters may prejudice gravely the
enforcement of the laws or the well-being of the community
within its territory.
'\Vhere such circun1stances arise, it is the duty of any foreign
State to come to an agreement enabling the State concerned to
exercise such rights of control over the merchant vessels of the
foreign State concluding the agreement as may be necessary.
For a State to refuS'e to enter into an agreement of this kind
would be to show an entire absence of the consideration for the
ri~hts of other States upon which the solidarity of nations depends. (Conference for the Codification of International Law,
Vol. II, Territorial '\Vaters, League of Nations, C. 74, M. 39, 1929,
v, p. 28.)

India assumed the same position, and Australia said:
They make no claim to exercise rights over the high seas outside the belt of territorial waters. This answer is made on the
understanding that the question relates only to claims to exercise sovereign rights over the 'vaters of the high seas, and does
not relate to claims to exercise jurisdiction over sedentary fisheries for pearl oysters and b~ches de mer, etc., on certain portions
of the sea bottom outside the 3-mile limit which by long usage
have come to be regarded as the subject of occupation and property. (Ibid., p. 24.)

Hague Report, 1923.-The Report of the Commission
of Jurists, 1923, appointed to consider new agencies of
warfare submitted certain rules that have not been ratified but are the latest expression of the result of of-
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these rules provide :
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Articles 47 and 48 of

"A neutral State is bound to take such steps as the means at its
disposal permit to prevent within its jurisdiction aerial observation of the movements, operations or defences of one belligerent, with the intention of informing the other belligerent."
The prohibition of aerial observation within neutral territory on belligerent account must apply equally to the case of
aircraft on board belligerent warships when in neutral waters.
To avoid all misconception on this point, the following paragraph has been added:
"This provision applies equally to a belligerent military aircraft on board a vessel of 'var."
The measures which a neutral Government may be obliged to
take to compel respect for its rights may entail the use of force;
fire may have to be opened on foreign aircraft, even military
aircraft of another State. Following the analogy of article 10
of Convention V of 1907 (Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
in Land 'Var) and article 26 of Convention XIII (Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers in :i\1aritime War), it has been thought
well to declare that the measures, even of force, taken by a
neutral Power for this purpose cannot be regarded as acts of war.
Still less could they be regarded as unfriendly acts, seeing that
they are taken in specific exercise of rights conferred or recognised
by treaty.
It may be well to add that the neutral Government will not be
responsible for any injury or damage done to the aircraft or
other object.
" ARTICLE
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"The action of a neutral Power in using force or other means
at its disposal in the exercise of its rights or duties under these
rules cannot be regarded as a hostile act." (1924, Naval War
College, International Law Documents, p. 136.)

The report of the co1nmission had also referred to
differences in the proposed limits of airspacf3 and territorial waters saying:
On principle it would seem that the jurisdiction in the airspace should be appurtenant to the territorial jurisdiction enjoyed beneath it, and that in the absence of a territorial jurisdiction beneath, there is no sound basis for jurisdiction in the
air. (Ibid., p. 152.)
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League of Nations committee, 19~6.-The League of
Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive
Codification of International La,v in 1926 communicated the report of a subcommittee on the la 'v of territorial waters to the governments. The subcon1mittee
stated that " The question of territorial 'vaters involves
a number of difficult problems of international law."
The subcommittBe found that many attempts had been
1nade to formulate the law of territorial waters and that
1nost diverse theories had been put forward upon the
subject.
League of Nations draft, 1926.-The draft of a convention as submitted by Professor Schiicking after discussion with the committee of experts appointed by the
League of Nations as prepatory to the codification of
the law of territorial waters, after escaping the 3-mile
limit for coast waters and the 10-mile limit for bays, contained the following :
ARTICLE

5

Islands
If there are natural islands, not continuously submerged, situated off a coast, the inner zone of the sea shall be measured
from these islands, except in the event of their being so far
distant from the mainland that they would not come within the
zone of the territorial sea if such zone were measured from the
mainland. In such case, the island shall have a special territorial sea for itself.
In the case of archipelagoes, the constituent islands are considered as forming a whole and the width of the territorial sea
• shall be measured from the islands most distant from the centre
of the archipelago.
ARTICLE

6

Straits
The regime of straits at present subject to special conventions
is reserved. In straits of which both shores belpng to the same
State, the sea shall be territorial, even if the distance between
the shores exceeds 10 miles, provided that that distance is not
exceeded at either entrance to the Strait. (League of Nations
Document, C. 196, 1\'l. 70, 1927, V. p. 72.)
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Attitude of Portugal, 1926.-In replying to the
League of Nations questionnaire as to territorial 'vaters
1n 1926, the Portuguese Government said:
Article V. If there are natural islands, not continuously submerged, situated off a coast at a distance fr01n the coast not
above 24 miles, the zone of the territorial sea shall be n1easured
.crmn these islands. 'Vhen the distance of the islands from the
.!Oast is above 24 miles, these islands shall have a territorial sea
for themselves, as if they were part of the mainland.
In the case of an archipelago, the component islands shall be
considered as forming a whole, and the width of the territoria~
sea shall be measured from the islands most distant from the
centre of the archipelago (see Observations). (League of Nations
Documents, C. 196, l\1. 70, 19-27, V [C. P. D. I. 95 ( 2) J, p. 189.)

The observations to which reference is made are as
follows:
Portugal is unable to forego a very much wider limit to her
territorial waters than 3 miles, since it is absolutely necessary
for her to preserve the species of fish which inhabit her waters,
these fisheries contributing largely towarc~s the feeding of her
population and the employment of her industries. If these species become rare or disappear Portugal's economic crisis, which
is already acute, will be considerably aggravated.
'Vhat is true of Portugal is also true of many other countries and therefore this clailn does not constitute a special
case. This extended Hmit has indeed become an established
usage in Portugal and in other countries, and is embodied in
the legislations of Portugal and various nations, as was first
pointed out in detail by the distinguished Professor ShUcking
in his 1nasterly report to the Committee of Experts for the
Progressive Codification of International Law. Beyond doubt,
the present needs of the nations are of more ilnportance than
traditions and ancient usage, and therefore Portugal demands
the extension to 12 miles of the limit of territorial ·waters, as
being more in conformity with present practice and the present
needs of the majority of States. If, however, for one reason
or another, this extension is impossible, Portugal considers that
a minimum limit of 6 miles should be fixed and that States
should have the right, in order to satisfy their vital needs or
those of their defence, to exercise adnlinistrative rights over
a .further zone of 6 miles beyond the zone of their sovereignty.
The limits for islands, archipelagoes, bays and straits were
fixed on the supposition that the limit of territorial waters
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was itself extended to 12 miles; if this limit is lowered, it will
be necessary also to restrict the zones fixed for these special
cases. (Ibid., p. 191.)

l)weden, 1926.-The Swedish Government in replying
to the League of Nations questionnaire in 1926 pointed
out that Sweden had for more than 100 years nlaintained a 4-mile claim to jurisdiction off the coast and that
12-mile limit for bays would be essential for Sweden.
As to islands and straits, the Government said :
Article 5.-Islanas.

One observation is necessary with regard to the wording of
this article. If the centre of an archipelago is regarded as the
point for determining the isles from which the calculation of
territorial waters is to commence, the provision regarding archipelagos would seem to apply only to those which are situated
in the open sea; it could not, for instance, apply to groups
which, like the Swedish coastal archipe1agos (skargard), fringe
the shoreline. To make Article 5 applicable to the conditions
of Swedish geography, it would therefore be necessary to add
a provision to the e:f!fect that when an archipelago fringes tp.e
coast, the extent of the territorial waters shall be calculated as
commencing from the islands and reefs furthest from the coast.
Article 6.-Straits.

The drafting of Article 6 also calls for an observation on
the part of the Swedish Government. In certain respects this
article is not quite clear, as, for instance, the provision which
lays down " the regime of straits at present subject to special
conventions." Does this provision mean that if two States whose
coast line borders certain straits conclude an agreement dividing
the whole of the straits between thein, this agreement can be
invoked against third parties, even when, under the convention
now proposed, the straits also include international waters?
According to the Rapporteur's original draft, ·which fixed the
extent of the territorial waters at 6 nautical miles in general,
straits not exceeding 12 miles in width were to belong entirely
to the riparian States. The extent of territorial ·waters having
been reduced to 3 nautical miles in the Rapporteur's second
draft, the logical consequence would have been to regard as
entirely territorial waters only those straits which are less than
6 nautical miles in breadth, or-when both shores of the straits
belong to the same State-those which are not more than 6
nautical miles wide at their opening towards the sea. The ~raft,
however, fixes at 10 miles the maximum width of straits which
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are to form part of the territorial sea of the coastal States.
The meaning of the formula "straits not exceeding 10 miles
in width" is also somewhat uncertain, for there is nothing
to show whether this formula only applies to straits which do
not exceed 10 miles in width at any point or whether it refers
to those parts of straights where the width is 10 miles or less,
whereas in other parts their width is more than 10 miles.
l\1oreover, as regards the Swedish standpoint in this matter,
the Swedish Government would point out that, since the Treaty
of Roskilde in 1658, one-half of the Sund has been regarded
as a Swedish territorial sea. Similarly the Straits of Kalmar, of
which both sides belong to Sweden, are regarded as entirely
Swedish territorial 'vaters. At their opening towards the sea
these two straits are both slightly over 10 nautical miles in
width. (League of Nations Documents, C. 196, M. 70, 1927, V.
[C. P. D. I. 95 (2)], p. 232.)

opinion, 19~7.-.In reply to the questionnaire preparatory to the meeting o:£ the Committee on
the Codification o:£ International Law, the Norwegian
Government in a letter o:£ March 3, 1927, said:
Article 2.-Extent of the Rights of the Riparian State.- * * *
f..T orwegian

As regards the tracing of the boundaries, it should be obserYed that the series of fjords and archipelagos ( skargard)
which are so characteristic a feature of the peculiar Norwegian
coast line, with its numerous fjords penetrating right into the
heart of the country and 'vith its countless islands, large and
small, islets and rocks scattered in a wide band along practically the whole of the coast, has made it quite impossible for
Norway to trace a boundary for her territorial waters corresponding to all the sinuosities of her coast line and skargard.
The boundary has therefore been drawn at a distance of 1 geographical league from the extreme edge of the coast at low
tide or from straight lines drawn between. the last outlying
islets or rocks not constantly covered by the sea, while, outside the bays and fjords (which from the most ancient times have
been regarded and claimed in extenso as internal Norwegian
waters), the limit has been measured from a line drawn between
the two farthermost sea ward ends of the coast (mainland, isle
or islet).
The Norwegian Government considers that, in these circumstances, it would be desirable-and, if ·Norway is to adhere to
the proposed Convention, necessary-so to draft the present
article that, as regards the extent and delimitation of the zone
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of sovereignty itself, it should, like Article 4, which relates to
bays, take into · proper account a peculiar de facto situation
which has been ,consecrated by continuous and century-old usage.
In the opinion of the Norwegian Govern1nent, it would be
neither natural nor reasonable to fix an identical limit of territorial \Vaters for all coasts without taking into account the
various characteristics of the latter and \Vithout making due
allowance for the varying importance, from the point of view
of national economy and the very existence of the inhabitants,
of the question of 1naintaining for the coastal population an
exclusive right to exploit the economic wealth of the territorial
sea. It would not even seem necessary to fix a standard boundary and we do not see how it would be possible to obtain such
a result on the lines laid down in the draft Convention. * * *
Article 5.-Islands.-As stated above, the boundary of Norwegian territorial waters is, according to Norwegian law, traced
at a distance of 1 geographical league from the jslands, islets
or rocks farthest seaward which are not constantly covered by
the sea. The general provision at present in force on this subject, contained in a Chancellery Memorandum of February 25,
1812, does not stipulate any limit as regards the distance between
these islands, islets and rocks and the mainland; it thus provides for a terri to rial sea extending in one continuous band along
the coast to a distance of 1 geographical league from the islands,
islets or rocks farthest seaward without taking account of the
distance which separates the latter from the continental coast
line.
In conformity with the observations it has felt bound to offer
in connection with Article 2 of the Draft, the Norwegian GoYernnlent feels that it would be desirable to draft the passages
of Article 5, which concern the delimitation of territorial waters
around islands, in such a way as to bring them reasonably into
line with Norwegian law on this subject, which owes its origin
to the peculiar geographical conditions of the country and has
been consecrated by continuous and century-old usage. (League
of Nations, Report to the Council, C. 196, l\1. 70, 1927, V
[C. P. D. I. 95 (2) ], p. 173.)

0 ontrol of straits.-The most recent discussion of the
control of \Vaters of straits is that carried on by the Harvard Law School Research in International Law \vhich
acted through a co1nmittee made up of nien fan1iliar \vith
international la\v and from all parts of the United
States. After \vide research and discussion, the report
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made in 1929 upon the article relating to straits was
with some omissions and some additions as follows:
ARTICLE

10

A strait connecting high seas shall remain open to navigation
by the private and public vessels of all states, including vessels of
war.

0 omment.-This article states the existing rule of international law which requires that straits connecting
high seas shall be open to navigation. This rule applies
even though the land on both sides is a part of the territory of a single state; it applies to all straits.
The Straits to which negotiations have n1ost often related are the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, the Danish
Sounds and Belts, and the Straits of Magellan.
b. Bosphorus and Dardanelles.-The Bosphorus is
about 18 miles long and from Y2 to 1% miles wide. The
Dardanelles is about 40 miles long and from 11!2 to 4
miles 'vide.
In the Near East the struggle for dominance has made
the Straits question one of the major matters of European policy. Turkey long in possession of the area bordering upon the Black Sea assumed full authority over
the 'vaters at its entrance. From the end of the eighteenth century navigation of the Black Sea and the
Straits became a matter of international negotiation.
The treaty of Belgrade, September 18, 1739, between
Russia and Turkey provides in article 3 " Que la Russie
ne pourra, ni sur la mer de Zabache ( Si vache), ni sur la
mer Noire, construire et a voir de flotte et d'autres navires" (I Noradounghian, Recueil d'Actes /nte:rnationaum de l'E1npire Ottonurn, p. 260), and in article 9 "Et
reciproquement il sera permis a tons les. marchands sujets
de l'Empereur des Russies, d'exercer aussi librement le
commerce dans les etats de la Porte Ottomane. Mais,
pour ce qui regarde le commerce des R usses sur la mer
Noire, il sera fait sur les batin1ents appartenants aux
Turcs." (Ibid., p. 262.)
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By the treaty o:f July 13, 1'841, in article 1 it was
stated: "Sa Hautesse le sultan declare qu'il a la :ferme
resolution de maintenir a l'avenir le principe invariablement etabli comme ancienne regie de son empire, et en
vertu duquel il a ete de tout temps de:fendu aux batiments de guerre des puissances etrangeres d'entrer dans
les detroits de Dardanelles et du Bosphore et que tant
que la Porte se trouve en paix, Sa Hautesse n'admettra
aucun batimel"l:t de guerre etranger dans les dits detroits,"
"et leurs Majestes * * * de l'autre part, s'engagent
a respecter cette determination du Sultan, et a se conformer au principe ci-dessus enonce." (Martens, N. R.
G. 1841, II, p. 128.) Thus the position o:f Turkey in
control o:f the Straits seemed to be confirmed and was
reaffirmed by the treaty o:f 1856. Many volumes have
been written upon various aspects o:f the questions o:f
closing the Black Sea and the Straits.
The United States not being a party to these treaties
did not recognize the control o:f the Bosphorus and
Dardanelles as a right though it was impossible to deny
the usage.
The World War introduced new problems which are
not yet settled. Article 178 o:f the treaty o:f Sevres, August 10, 1920, proposed to guarantee the :freedom o:f the
Straits. Upon general principles o:f law apart :from all
considerations o:f politics, there seems no reason :for
maintaining that the Black Sea is a closed sea and that
the Straits are under the control o:f Turkey any more
than there might be :for contending that the Baltic Sea
is a closed sea and that the sounds may be closed.
Danish Sounds.-The claim that the Baltic Sea should
be a closed sea has been made :for varying reasons.
Under article 5 o:f the treaty between the United
States and Denmark o:f 1826 it 'vas agreed that " N either the vessels o:f the United States nor their cargoes
shall, when they pass the Sound o:f the Belts, pay higher
or other duties than those which are or may be paid
by the most :favored nation." (8 U. S. Stat. 340.) This
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treaty was to re1nain in effect for 10 years and for " one
year after either of the contracting parties shall have
given notice to the other of its intention to terminate
the same. ~
The United States in 1855 gave notice of the termination of the treaty of 1826 and a new treaty was negotiated in 1857 by 'vhich, in article 1, entire freedom of
navigation was declared for American vessels in the
Sound and Belts. (11 Stat. 719.) The United States
in consideration of the Danish engagement to keep up
lights and buoys and to Inake " additions and improvements in regard to the lights, buoys and pilot establishments " as might be required, agreed to pay to Denmark $393,011. Certain European powers similarly
accepted their respective quotas by a conventional
agreement. The Sound dues were no longer collected
and the navigation between the North Sea and the Baltic
became free.
5

Under the public law of nations it can not be pretended that
Denmark has any right to levy duties on vessels passing through
the sound from the North Sea to the Baltic. Under that law
the navigation of the two seas connected by this strait is free
to all nations; and therefore the navigation of the channel by
which they are connected ought also to be free. In the language employed by Mr. vVharton " even if such strait be bounded
on both sides by the territory of the same sovereign and is at the
same time so narrow as to be commanded by cannon-shot from
both shores, the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of that sovereign over such strait is controlled by the right of other nations
to communtcate with the seas thus connected." (House Ex. Doc.
108, 33 Cong., 1 sess., 1848, pp. 38-39.)

Straits of lJf agellan.-The Straits of Magellan, about
300 miles long and from 272 to 11 miles wide form a
convenient passage between the great oceans which wash
the coasts of the South American continent. At the
eastern entrance the Argentine Republic and Chile have
territory upon opposite shores though the most of the
Straits is wholly between Chilean shores.
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The treaty of 1848 bet,veen these states gave rise to
many difficulties. At length by the treaty of July 23,
1881, bet,veen the Argentine Republic and Chile, it was
agreed, "Article 5. Le Detroit de Magellan demeure
neutralise a perpetuite et sa libre navigation est assuree
aux pavilions de toutes les nations. Afin d'assurer le respect de cette liberte et de cette neutralite il ne sera construit sur ses cotes, ni fortifications, ni ouvrages de defense militaire qui puissent contrarier ce but." (Martens,
N. R. G. XII, 2e Ser. 491; 72 Brit. and For. State
Papers, p. 1103.)
The World War conditions gave rise to questions as to
the nature of the neutrality under the treaties. As the
greater part of -the Straits of Magellan is under the
jurisdiction of Chile, that state early made known its
attitude. A decree of December 15, 1914, stated, " In
reference to the· neutrality established in the decree
No. 1857 of November 5 last of the ministry of foreign
affairs, the interior waters of the Straits of Magellan
and the canals of the southern region, even in parts
'vhich are distant more than 3 miles from either bank,
should be considered as forming part of the jurisdictional
or neutral sea." (1916 Naval War College, International
Law Topics, p. 21.)
In the case of the Bangor coming before the British
Prize Court in 1916, it was said :
The limits of territorial waters, in relation to national and
international rights and privileges, have of recent years been
subject to much discussion. It may well be that the old marine
league, which for long determined the boundaries of territorial
waters, ought to be extended by reason of the enlarged range
of guns used for shore protection.
This case does not, in my view, call for any pronouncement
upon that question. I am content to decide the question of
law raised by the claimants upon the assumption that the capture took place within the territorial waters of the Republic
of Chile. This assumption, of course, does not ilnply any expression of opinion as to the character of the Strait of l\iagellan
as between Chile and other nations. This strait connects the
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two Yast free oceans of the Atlantic and Pacific. As such,
the strait must be considered free for the commerce of all
nations passing between the two oceans.
In 1879 the GoYernment of the United States of An1erica
declared that it would not tolerate exclusive claims by any nation whatsoeYer to the Strait of l\Iagellan, and would hold responsible any GoYernment that undertook, no matter on what
pretext, to lay any impost on its commerce through the strait.
Later, in 1881, the Republic of Chile entered into a ti'eaty with
the Argentine Republic by which the strait was declared to be
neutralized forever, and free navigation was guaranteed to the
flags of all nations.
I haYe refen·ed to these matters in order to show that there
is a right of free passage through the strait for commercial purposes. It is not inconsistent with this that, during war between
any nations entitled to use it for commerce, the strait should be
regarded in whole or in part as the territorial waters of Chile,
\vhose lands bound it on both sides.
Upon the assumption made for the purposes of this ease that
the Bangor was in fact captured within the territorial waters of
a neutral, the question is whether the Yessel was immune fron1
legal capture and its consequences according to the law of nations. In other words, can the owners of the vessel, who cue,
ex hypothesi, to be treated as enemies, rely upon the territorial
rights of a neutral State and object to the capture? Or must the
objection to the validity of the capture come from the neutral
State alone?
No proposition in international law is clearer, or more sarely
established, than that a capture within the territorial waters of
a neutral is, as between enemy belligerents for all purposes rightful; and that it is only by the neutral State concerned that the
legal validity of the capture can be questioned. ( [1916], Probate,
p. 181.)

St1?aits connecting open seas.-Extreme claims as to ·
straits had been made at various times as the English
claims to Bristol and St. George's Channels. As in the
case of the Danish Sounds, these have gradually dj_sappeared. The United States properly contended that any
freedom of the seas or freedom of navigation would be
largely a fiction if passage between the different seas
might be closed at the will of the shore states or if a tax
were levied for simple passage.
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It is a source of much satisfaction to Her Majesty's Govern1nent
that the initiative in bringing this question to a final settlement
should have been taken by the Danish Government, for altho the
right to levy dues upon foreign vessels passing through the Sound
has been recognized by the different powers of Europe, and ha<l
beco1ne a part of the international law of Europe, yet it has long
been apparent that a tax which is oppressive to comn1err'e. for
which no benefit is offered in return to foreign shipping * * *
could not be permanently Inaintained. ( 46 Brit. and For. State
Papers, 1855-1856, p. 661.)

The resolutions adopted by the Institut de Droit International, at its session in 1892 provide:
Article 10. Les dispositions des articles precedents s'appliquent
aux detroits dont l'ecart n'exede pas douze milles, sauf les modifications et distinctions suivantes:
1. Les detroits dont les cotes appartiennetnt a des Etats differents font partie de la mer territoriale des Etats riverains, qui
y exerceront leur souverainete jusqu'a la ligne mediane.
2. Les detroits dont les cotes appartiennent au meme Etat et
qui sont indispensables aux communications maritimes entre
deux ou plusieurs Etats autres que l'Etat riverain font toujours
partie de la mer territoriale du riverain, quel que soit le reapproachement des cotes.
3. Les detroits qui servent de passage d'une mer libre a une
autre mer libre ne peuvent jamais etre fermes.
Article 11. Le regime des detroits actuellement soumis a des
conventions ou usages speciaux demeure reserve. (13 Annuaire,
p. 330.)

Treaties and conventions.-The status o:f straits has
o:ften been a subject o:f treaty regulation. An early exanlple is the treaty between Great Britain and Russia,
1825:
Article III. C01nmencing from the Southernmost Point of the
Island called Prince of Wales Island, which Point lies in the parallel of 54 degrees 40 minutes North latitude and between the
131st and the 133rc1 degree of \Vest longitude ( l\1eridian of Green'vich), the said line shall ascend to the North along the channel
called Portland Channel as far as the Point of the Continent
'vhere it strikes the 56th degree of North Latitude. (Convention
between Great Britain and Russia, St. Petersburg, Feb. 1/16,
1825. 12 Brit. & For. State Papers, p. 38.)
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In commenting on this article, Professor J. Guillermo
Guerra in his study, " Les Eaux Territori ales dans les
Detroits," published in Revue Generale de Droit International Public, Vol. 31, pp. 232-254, vvrites as :follows :
Ce traite fut ensuite applique dans les rapports cle la GrandeBretagne et des Etats-Unis, qui avaient succede aux droits de la
Russie sur le territoire de !'Alaska. S'il n'a pas indique en
termes expres la ligne qui devait etre suivie dans la demarcation
des souverainetes sur le canal de Portland, d'une etendue de 60
1nilles, les deux gouvernements l'ont du moins interprete en ce
sens que c'est la ligne mediane qu'il fault prendre en consideration.

By Article III o:f the treaty o:f Nanking, 1842, between
Great Britain and China (Treaties between China and
Foreign States, published by order o:f Inspector General
o:f Customs, p. 351) it was provided that China should
cede Hong l(ong to Great Britain. In comn1enting upon
Article III o:f this treaty Professor Guerra says:
En 1842 par le traite de Nankin (Art 3), la Grande-Bretagne
acquit la souverainete sur la petite ne de Hongkong, situee a
!'entree de l'estuaire de Canton. Cette petite ile est separee du
continent chinois par la passe de Laimun dont la largeur est si
reduite qu'elle n'atteint pas un mille. Dans le traite de cession,
rien ne fut stipule au sujet de la juridiction anglaise ou de la
juridiction chinoise sur les eaux du petit detroit qui separait
ainsi les deux souverainetes. l\Iair, d'apres le temoignage de
Sir Travers Twiss, d'Oppenheim et d'autres auteurs encore, les
deux puissances ont en fait exerce leur juridiction separement
jusqu'au fil moyen des eaux.

The treaty o:f June 15, 1846, Great Britain and the
United States provides:
Article I. From the point on the forty-ninth parallel of north
latitude, where the boundary laid down in existing treaties and
conventions between the United States and Great Britain terminates, the line of boundary between the territories of the United
States and those of her Britannic Majesty shall be continued
westward along the said forty-ninth parallel of north latitude to
the middle of the channel wh:ch separates the continent from
Vancouver's Island, and thence southerly through the middle of
the said channel, and of Fuca's Straits, to the Pacific Ocean:Provided, however, That the navigation of the whole of the said
138120-32--5
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channel and straits, south of the forty-ninth parallel of uorth
latitude, shall remain free and open to both parties. (9 U. S.
Stat. 869.)

In con11nenting on the above article, Hall, International La 'v, Eighth Edition, edited by Pearce Higgins,
writes as foil o'vs :
By the treaty of Washington of 1846 it was stipulated that
the boundary between the United States and British North
America should follow the forty-ninth parallel of latitude to the
middle of the strait separating Vancouver's Island fr01n the
continent and from there should run down the middle of the
Strait of Fuca to the Pacific. Disputes involving the title to
various islands having arisen, the boundary question at issue
between the two nations was submitted to the arbitration of
the German Emperor and in 1873 a protocol was signed at
Washington for the purpose of marking out the frontier in accordance with his arbitral decision. Under this protocol, the
boundary after passing the islands which had given rise to the
dispute is carried across a space of water 35 miles long by 20
miles broad, and is then continued for 50 miles down the middle
of a strait 15 miles broad until it touches the Pacific Ocean midway between Bonilla Point on Vancouver's Island and Tatooch
Island lighthouse on the A1nerican shore, the waterway being
there 10¥2 miles in width (p. 195).

The treaty of Copenhagen, Jfarch 14, 1857.-" Treaty
between Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France, Hanover, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Oldenburg, Netherlands,
Prussia, Russia, Sweden and Norway, and the Hanse
Towns, on the one part, and Denmark, on the other
part, for the Redemption of the Sound Dues."
Article I. De ne
de balisage * *
Mer du Nord dans
Belts ou le Sund,
danoises * * *.
p. 24.)

prelever aucun droit de douane, de tonnage,
* sur les navires qui se rendront de la
la Baltique, ou v·ice versa, en passant par les
soit qu'ils se bornent a traverser les eaux
(47 Brit. and For. State Papers, 1856--1857,

A declaration to the following effect between Great
Britain and France was signed at London, April 3, 1904,
respecting Egypt and Morocco :

TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

61

Article VII. In order to secure the free passage of the Straits
of Gibraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erec~
tion of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion
of the coast of l\1orocco comprised between, but not including,
l\Ielilla and the heights which command the right bank of the
River Sebou. (97 Brit. and For. State Papers, 1903-1904, p. 40.)

A convention o£ April 11, 1908, betvveen Great Britain
and the United States relating to the international
boundary provided:
The remaining portion of the line, lying between the two
above-described sections, and upon the location of which the
said former Commissioners did not agree, shall pass through
the center of the Lubec Narrows Channel between Campo Bello
Island and the mainland. (35 U. S. Stat. 2003.)

A further treaty, May 21, 1910, between Great Britain and the United States concerning the boundary line
in Passamaquoddy Bay provided:
Now, Therefore, upon the evidence and arguments so pre~
sented, and after taking into consideration all actions of the
respective Governments and of their representatives authorized
in that behalf and of the local governments on either side of
the line, whether prior or subsequent to such treaties and award,
tending to aid in the interpretation thereof, the High Contracting
Parties hereby agree that the location of the international boundary line between the United States and the Dominion · of Canada
from a point in Passamaquoddy Bay accurately defined in the
Treaty between the United States and Great Britain of April 11,
1908, as lying between Treat Island and Friar Head, and extending thence through Passamaquoddy Bay and to the middle of
Grand lYianan Channel, shall run in a series of seven connected
straight lines for the distances and in the directions as follows.
(36 U. S. Stat. 2477.)

The Bosphorus and Dardanelles, 19B0-19B3.-The Bosphorus and Dardanelles have £rom early times been the
scene o£ controversies. Regulation of the use o£ the
Straits has been the subject o£ many diplomatic discussions. For a long time the use o£ the Straits was governed by the treaties o£ 1856 and 1871 by which vessels
o£ war were in general excluded.
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The post,var negotiations resulted in the unratified
treaty of Sevres, August 10, 1920, in 'vhich among the
articles relating to the Straits 'vere the follo,ving:
Article 37. The navigation of the Straits, including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bospllorus, shall in future
be open, both in peace and war, to every vessel of commerce or
of war and to military and commercial aircraft, without distinction of flag.
These waters shall not be subject to blockade, nor shall any
belligerent right be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed within them, unless in pursuance of a decision of the
Council of the League of Nations.
Artkle 38. The Turkish Government recognizes that it is necessary to take further measures to ensure the freedom of na vigation provided for in Article 37, and accordingly delegates, so
far as it is concerned, to a COinmission to be called the Commission of the Straits, and hereinafter referred to as the Commb;;.
sion, the control of the waters specified in Article 39.
The Greek Government, so far as it is concerned, delegates to
the Commission the same powers and undertakes to give it in all
respects the same facilities.
Such control shall be exercised in the name of the Turkish and
Greek Governments respectively, and in the manner provided in
this Section.
Article 39. The authority of the Commission will extend to all
the waters between the Mediterranean mouth of the Dardanelles
and the Black Sea 1nouth of the Bosphorus, and to the waters
within 3 miles of each of these mouths.
This authority may be exercised on shore to such extent as may
be necessary for the execution of the provisions of this Section.

The treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, which became
operative provided:
Article 23. The high contracting parties are agreed to recognize
and declare the principle of freed01n of transit and of navigation,
by sea and by air, in time of peace as in tin1e of \Yar, in the
strait of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and.the Bosphorus,
as prescribed in the separate convention signed this day, regarding
the regime of the Straits. This convention will have the same
force and effect in so far as the present high contracting parties
are concerned as if it formed part of the present treaty. (28 L.
N. T. S., p. 13; see also 18 Amer. Journal International Law, Supplement, 1924, p. 11.)
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In the convention relating to the regi1ne of the Straits
also signed July 24, 1923, it was provided in regard to
(2) ·warships, including fleet auxiliaries, troopships,
aircraft carriers, and military aircraft:
(a)

* * *

(b) In time of war, Turkey being neutral.
Complete freedom of passage by day and by night under any
flag, without any formalities, or tax. or charge whatever, under
the same limitations as in paragraph 2 (a).
However, these limitations will not be applicable to any belligerent Power to the prejudice of its belligerent rights in the
Black Sea.
The rights and duties of Turkey as a neutral Power cannot
authorize her to take any measures liable to interfere with navigation through the Straits, the waters of which, and the air
above whirch, must remain entirely free in time of war, Turkey
being neutral, just as in time of peace.
'Varships and military aircraft of belligerents will be forbidden to make any capture, to exercise the right of visit and search,
or to carry out any other hostile act in the Straits.
As regards revictualling and carrying out repairs, war vessels
will be subject to the terms of the Thirteenth Hague Convention of 1907, dealing with Inaritime neutrality.
l\Iilitary aircraft will receive in the Straits similar treatment
to that accorded under the Thirteenth Hague Convention of 1907
to warships, pending the conclusion of an international ~onvention
establishing the rules of neutrality for aircraft.
(c) In tirne of war, Turkey being belligm··ent.

Complete freedom of passage for neutral warships, without any
formalities, or tax, or charge whatever, but under the same limitations as in paragraph 2 (a).
The measures taken by Turkey to prevent enemy ships and
aircraft from using the Straits are not to be of such a nature as
to prevent the free passage of neutral ships and aircraft, and
Turkey agrees to provide the said ship and aircraft with either
the necessary instructions or pilots for the above .purpose.
Neutral n1ilitary aircraft will make the passage of the Straits
at their own risk and peril, and will submit to investigation as to
their character. For this purpose aircraft are to alight on the
ground or on the sea in such areas as are specified and prepared
for this purpose by Turkey.
(3) (a) The passage of the Straits by submatines of Powers at
peace with Turkey must be made on the surface. (28 L. N. T. S.,
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p. 115; see also 18 Amer. Journal International Law, Supple1nent,
1924, p. 56.)

The proposed treaty "\vith United States, signed August 6, 1923, "\vould have covered many o:f the provisions
o:f the treaty o:f Lausanne.
Islands and archipelagoes.-The Harvard La'v School
Research in International Law also considered mariti1ne
jurisdiction around islands and in its draft on territorial waters drew up the :follo"ring:
ARTICLE

7

The marginal sea around an island, or around land exposed
only at some stage of the tide, is measured outward 3 miles therefrom in the same manner as from the mainland.

0 on11nent.-""\V"ith some additions and omissions the
co1nment on the article :follows :
The practice is nearly uni:for1n in beginning to measure
the 1narginal sea :from low "\Vater mark along the coasts
o:f a mainland. The only difficulty arises in connection
with rocks, islands, reefs, etc., lying off the coast. I:f an
island lies not 1nore than 6 miles :from the coast, the
n1arginal sea should be extended t9 a distance o:f 3
miles :from the island. Similarly in any situation "\vhere
islands are within 6 miles o:f the coast or o:f each other,
1narginal waters "\viii mingle and :form OI~e extended
zone. No different rule should be established :for groups
o:f islands or archipelagoes, except that i:f the outer
:fringe o:f islands are sufficiently close to :for1n one belt,
any "\vider expanse o:f water "\vithin such belt should be
considered territorial. I:f all the islands o:f a group
belong to one state and the separating distance is 6
and a :fraction miles, thus leaving a narro"\v passage bet,veen marginal seas, it would see1n equitable to permit
an extension, but there can not be said to be any established rule on the point. It might be possible to agree
that "\vhere the intervening passage is less than 1 1nile
(or less than one-hal:f mile) in "\vidth, the littoral State
may consider such "\Vaters as part o:f its marginal sea.
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In the above connection, any rock, coral, mud, sand,
or other natural solid formation which is exposed above
the surface of the 'vater at low tide, should be considered
an " island." If a fringe of exposed rocks is situated
at a distance of say 10 n1iles fron1 the coast, there seems
to be no established basis for considering all waters between the rocks and the mainland as terri to rial waters.
Special consideration should, however, be . accorded to
claims established and Ina in tained over a long period
of time. Such 1nay be the Scandinavian claims and
those of Australia.
Att-itude of the United States.-~Ir. Bayard, Secretary of State, in a letter to ~fr. Manning, Secretary o:f
the Treasury, ~fay 28, 1886, referred to the coastal jurisdiction of the United States:
'Ve may, therefore, regard it as settled * * * that so far
as concerns the eastern coast of North America, the position of
this Department has uniformly been that the sovereignty of
the shore does not, so far as territorial authority is concerned,
extend beyond 3 miles fron1 low-water mark, and that the seaward boundary of this zone of territorial waters follows the
coast of the mainland, extending where there are islands so
as to place round such islands the same belt. This necessarily
excludes the position that the seaward boundary is to be dra,vn
from headland to headland, and n1akes it follow closely, at a
distance of 3 miles, the boundary of the shore of the continent
or of adjacent islands belonging to the continental sovereign.
(I 'Vharton, Digest of International Law, p. 107.)

Spitsbe1·gen.-Special provision was 1nade in regard to
Spitsbergen by treaty on February 9, 1920.
In article 1 of this treaty, the powers recognized "the
full and absolute sovereignty of Norway over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen," etc., "between 10° and 35° longitude East of. Greenwich and between 74 ° and 81° latitude North." In article 2 it is provided thatships and nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall
enjoy equally the rights of fishing and hunting in the territories
spe<;ified in Article 1 and in their territorial waters.
Norway shall be free to maintain, take or de<;ree suitable measures to insure the preservation and, if necessary, the re-constitu-
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tion of the fauna and flora of the said regions, and their territorial waters. ( 43 U. S. Stat. 1892.)

Legislation and decrees.-There has been from time
to time legislation in regard to lands along the coast.
A French law of 1912 provides:
Article 2. Pour !'application des regles de la convention XIII
de la Haye en date du 18 octobre 1907:
"Les eaux territoriales fran{;aises s'etendent en de{;a d'une
limite qui est fixee a 10 milles marins au large de la laisse de la
basse mer le long de toutes les cotes et des banes decouvrants qui
en dependent, ainsi que autour du balisage fixe qui determine la
limite des banes non decouvrants." (Journal officiel de la Republique Fran~aise, 1912, Sept.-Oct., p. 8976.)

Russia in pre-war days foresaw certain exceptional
conditions on its icy coast.
1. \Vhere the extent of the seashore radius is not defined by
special international enactments or treaties, the present rules
cover the coastal sea to a distance of 3 geographical miles
(equals 12.02 marine miles equals 20.87 versts), counting from
the line of lowest ebb-tide or from the extremity of the coastal
standing ice. (Russian law No. 10H6 of May 29, 1911; 1912 U. S.
For. Rel., p. 1303.)

Uruguay in providing for neutrality proclaimed:
In accordance with the principle established by the treaty of
Montevideo in 1889 (Penal Law, Article 12), and with the principles generally accepted in these matters, the waters will be considered as territorial waters, to a distance of 5 miles from the
coast of the rna inland and islands, from the visible outlying
shoals, and the fixed marks which determine the · limit of the
banks not visible." (Neutrality Proclamation of August 7, 1914,
art. 2; 1916 Naval War College, International Law Documents,
pp. 106-107.)

Differences of opinion.-Even on the matter of the
measurement of territorial sea along the coast there remains difference of opinions. In regard to other maritime areas there is even wider variation of opinion. For
the Conference for the Codification of International
Law certain bases of discussion were dra 'vn up by the
preparatory co1nmittee in 1929. One of these was Basis
of Discussion No. 3 :
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The breadth of the territorial waters under the sovereignty of
the coastal State is 3 na1,1tical miles.

The conference met at The Hague in 1930 and after
discussion, a provisional expression o:f opinion as to the
extent o:f territorial sea was proposed and, with the distinct understanding that the expression o:f opinion should
not be regarded as final, the :following statements were
1nade:
1\Ir. Lansdown (Union of South Africa) .-I beg to express my
view in favour of Basis No. 3 as printed, that the breadth of territorial waters should be 3 nautical miles.
l\I. Schiicking (Germany) .-The German Delegation is in favour of the 3-Inile rule, together with the existence of an adjacent
zone, in the hope that the acceptance of the principle of the
adjacent zone may facilitate the acceptance of the 3-mile rule by
other countries.
l\Ir. l\Iiller (U. S. A.) .-I read one sentence which is contained
in various existing treaties of the United States:
"The High Contracting Parties declare that it is their firm
intention to uphold the principle that 3 marine miles extending
from the coast line outwards and measured from low water mark
constitute the proper limits of territorial waters."
l\I. de Ruelle (Belgium) .-We accept the 3-mile rule, together
with a zone of adjacent waters.
Sir l\Iaurice Gwyer (Great Britain) .-The British Delegation
firmly support Basis No. 3-that is to say, a territorial belt
of 3 Iniles without the exercise, as of right, of any powers by
the Coastal State in the contiguous zone, and they do that on
three grounds, 'vhich I will express in as few words as I can:
First, because in their view the 3-mile limit is a rule of international law already existing adopted by maritime nations which
possess nearly 80 per cent of the effective tonnage of the world;
secondly, because we have already, in this Committee, adopted
the principle of sovereignty over territorial waters; and thirdly,
because the 3-mile limit is the limit which is most in favour of
freedom of navigation.
I ought to add that in this matter I speak also on behalf of
His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia.
l\Ir. Pearson (Canada) .-The Government of Canada is in favour of the 3-mile territorial limit for all nations and for all
purposes~
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M. ~Iarchant (Chile) .-The Chilean Delegation will accept 6
miles as the breadth of territorial waters without an adjacent
zone, or 3 miles with an adjacent zone.
l\1. ,V. Hsieh (China) .-The Chinese Delegation accepts the
Basis of Discussion No. 3 in principle.
M. Arango (Colombia).-! am in favour of the 6-mile limit.
M. de Arinenteros (Cuba) .-The Cuban Delegation is against
Basis No. 3. I pronounce myself in favour of 6 miles with an
adjacent zone.
l\1. Lorek (Denmark) .-,Ve are in principle in favour of Basis
of Discussion No. 3, but as the rules concerning bays are very
unsettled and the question of bays is of great importance to Denmark, it is impossible for me to give a definite decision at the
n1oment.
Abel Hamid Badaoui Pacha (Egypt) .-We are in favour of 3
miles territorial 'vater, together with an adjacent zone.
M. Angulo (Spain) .-In accordance with their amendment, the
Spanish Delegation is in favour of 6 miles territorial 'vater,
together with an adjacent zone.
l\1. Varn1a (Estonia) .-The Estonian Delegation wishes for the
3 miles territorial water, and an adjacent zone.
l\1. Erich (Finland) .-For reasons of solidarity with its neighbours the Scandinavian States, the Finnish Delegation favours
a zone of 4 miles for territorial waters, provided an adjacent
zone of sufficient width is granted to her at the same time. In
the latter case the Finnish Delegation could also accept a 3-mile
zone, but primarily she favours a 4-Inile zone. If, contrary to
expectations, the majority of the Commission did not pronounce
in favour of an adjacent zone, the Finnish Delegation reserves
the right to con1e back to this question and to take a different
attitude regarding the depth of territorial 'vaters.
M. Gidel (France) .-France has no objection to the acceptance
of the 3-mile rule, provided that there is a belt of adjacent
waters, and subject· to the rules which may be agreed to in
regard to the method of determining the datum line of the
territorial belt.
l\1. Giannini (Italy) .-May I ask my French colleague the
meaning of the reservation he has 1nade.
l\1. Gidel (France).-! will explain n1yself more fully on a
subsequent occasion as I would not wish to prolong this process of voting. I thought however that I had made my meaning sufficiently clear; we desire an adjacent zone and we accept
the 3-mile limit provided that a solution satisfactory to us is
arrived at with regard to the datum line of the territorial belt.
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Spiropoulos (Greece) .-The Greek Delegation has already
stated that they accept the 3-mile rule. They would even be
prepared to accept 2 miles in the interests of the freedom of
navigation if all States w~re prepared to accept it. As we
have already accepted the 3-mile limit and the principle of
sovereignty, the Greek Delegation considers that no adjacent
zone is necessary. However, as there are some countries which
desire a greater extent than 3 miles of territorial waters, they
would even be prepared to accept an adjacent zone, particularly as Greece, according to the legislation at present in force,
already possesses one.
Sir Ewart Greaves (India) .-The Government of India accepts Basis No. 3.
::\lr. Charles Green (Irish Free State) .-The Gover1unent of
the Irish Free State accepts Basis No. 3 as printed, but recognises that, in certain countries and for certain purposes, there
are require1nents of the nature set out in Basis No. 5.
:\1. Bjornssen (Iceland) .-The Icelandic Delegation accepts
4 miles.
:\I. Giannini (Italy) .-Six miles.
:l\1. :\Iushakoji (Japan) .-The Japanese Delegation accepts the
3-mile limit without an adjacent zone.
1\I. Albat (Latvia) .-The Latvian Delegation accepts 6 miles
with an adjacent zone.
:\1. Raestad (Norway) .-As there is no binding rule of international law on this question, the Norwegian Government
considers that it is necessary to take into consideration the requirements of the different countries. The Delegation pro..
nounces in favour of the limit of 4 miles; that rule is older than
the 3-mile rule.
\Vith regard to other countries, the Norweigian Government
would be prepared to recognize a greater width of territorial
waters provided, as is stated in the Norwegian Government's
printed reply,. that the demand was based on continuous and
ancient usage.
\Vith regard to adjacent waters, they must be limited by
the needs regarding customs and security.
Admiral Surie (Netherlands) .-The Netherlands Delegation
cannot give an opinion on the question of adjacent waters until
it is informed what rights will be involved. It is, however,
prepared to accept Basis No. 3 as regards the breadth of the
territorial waters, which it accepts at three miles.
It bases its decision, first on the necessity of safeguarding
the interest of commercial navigation on the high seas, and
secondly, on the consideration of not placing any too heavy
obligations on the Coastal State.

70

NEUTRALITY AND TEHRITORIAL WATERS

M. Sepahbodi (Persia) .-The Persian Delegation accepts the
6-mile rule with an adjacent zone.
M. Makowski (Poland) .-The Polish Delegation is in favour of
a 3-mile breadth of territorial waters together 'vith an adjacent
zone sufficiently wide to enable the Coastal State to protect its
legitimate interests.
M. de Magalhaes (Portugal) .-The Portuguese Delegation has
already said that it desires a territorial belt of 12 miles in width,
but it is prepared to accept a belt of 6 miles provided there is an
adjacent zone also of 6 miles in width.
The reason for the claim of a territorial belt of 6 miles is,
firstly, because of the special position of Portugal on the continental plateau and its possession of fisheries 'vhich are vital to
its interests, and secondly, for a general reason; that is to say~
that the 3-mile limit is inadequate, as is proved by the claims for
adjacent waters which have been put forward by many other
countries, some of them demanding a great width for the adjacent zone.
They therefore accept the 6-mile belt together with adjacent
'vaters, and in those adjacent waters they demand to be accorded
police rights over fisheries such as have been recommended in all
recent fishery congresses.
M. Meitani (Roumania) .-The Roumanian Delegation accepts
a territorial belt of 6 miles and reserves its attitude on the question of adjacent waters.
M. Sjoborg (Sweden) .-The Swedish Delegation desires a territorial belt of 4 miles in width, but recognises as legitimate the
other historic belts at present in force in a certain number of
countries, that is, for example, 3 and 6 mile zones.
M. Sitensky (Czechoslovakia) .-The Czechoslovak Delegation
desires the greatest possible freedom of navigation, but not having
any coast line they consider that they should abstain from proposing a definite extent for the zone of territorial waters.
Chinasi Bey (Turkey) .-The Turkish Delegation desires a 6mile belt of territorial waters with an adjacent zone.
M. Buero (Uruguay) .-The Uruguayan Delegation desires a
territorial belt of 6 miles and reserves its attitude on the question
of adjacent waters.
M. Novakovitch (Yugoslavia) .-The Yugoslav Delegation desires a territorial belt of 6 miles and reserves its attitude on the
question of adjacent waters.
M. de Vianna-I{elsch (Brazil) .-The Brazilian Delegation accepts a territorial belt of 6 miles for all purposes.
1\I. Egoriew (U. S. S. R.) .-If one takes into consideration the
state of positive law at the present time, as it can be discovered
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in the legislation of the different States through treaties and
diplomatic correspondence, it is necessary to recognise the great
diversity of view which exists in the waters called territorial anct
adjacent. The exercise of such rights for all purposes or for cerM
tain purposes is admitted sometimes within the limit of 3, someM
times 4, 6, 10 or 12 miles.
The reasons, both historical and theoretical, invoked by some
States and disputed by others, cannot be put into opposition to
these facts and the rule or actual necessity for States to ensure
their needs, particularly in waters along the coast which are
not used for international navigation. This aspect which has
been already noted in the literature on the subject, as well as
in debates, in this Commission, cannot be overlooked. (League
of Nations, C. 230, l\I. 117, 1930, V, Conf. C. D. I. 19 (2), p. 15.)

\Vhen the differences of opinion upon the fundamental
question of coastal jurisdiction are diverse, it is evident
that states may find grounds £or demanding that their
security be not endangered by too strict interpretation
o£ the widely accepted rule of the 3-mile limit of maritime jurisdiction.
The "Fagernes."-The case of the Fagernes arose
from a collision between the British owned steamship
Cornish Coast and the Italian owned Fagernes on
~1arch 17, 1926. The collision took place in the Bristol
Channel at a point " 10 or 12lj2 miles distance from the
English coast and 9¥2 or 7¥2 miles from the Welsh
coast," according to the respective cases, the distance
across the channel being about 20 sea miles. The question
arose as to whether the collision took place within British jurisdiction. When the case came before the court
in 1926, it was said of the place of collision, " I£ that
spot is within the jurisdiction it is immaterial whether
it is in England or in Wales. It is equally within the
jurisdiction of the High Court." (1926, Probate Divorce
and Admiralty, p. 185.) The point at which the collision occurred was held by Mr. Justice Hill to be within
British jurisdiction. Later this case came before the
judges of the Court of Appeal. For this court -the
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Attorney General \vas asked \vhether the Cro,vn clain1ed
that the place of collision was " within the reahn of
England."
The Attorney General replied that the Secretary of State for
Home Affairs instructed him to say that " the spot \vhere this
collision is alleged to have occurred is not within the limits to
\vhich the territorial sovereignty of His Majesty extends." (1927,
P., p. 319.)

In the opinion of Bankes, L. J., is mentioned the appearance of the Attorney General and it is stated thathe gave the Court an exhaustive statement of the opinions of
jurists and text writers from very early times upon this much
discussed question of the territorial jurisdiction over creeks,
bays, etc. ; and he referred the Court to all the relevant authorities, with the view of inducing the Court not to lay do,vn any
rule on the question, but to content themselves merely by saying
that there was no authority for holding that the place of this
collision ·was \Vithin the jurisdiction. The question of \vhat is
within the realm of England being one of the matters of which
the Court takes judicial notice, we thought it right to ask the
Attorney General whether the Crown did or did not claim that
particular part of the Bristol Channel where this collision occurred, as being within the territorial jurisdiction of the I<:ing;
and he replied that the Cro·wn did not. This information was
given at the instance of the Court, and for the information of
the Court. Given under such circumstances, and on such a subject, it does not in my opinion necessarily bind the Court in the
sense that it is under an obligation to accept it.
Having regard, however, to the position created by the information given to the Court by the Attorney General, to absence of
authority and to the general trend of the more recent opinion
on the ·question of limiting the width of the fauces terrae to \Vhich
the rule of territorial jurisdiction should apply, I think the
Court ought to be guided by the infonnation given to the Court
by the Attorney General, to the extent of saying that they do not
consider that there is sufficient authority for supporting the judgment of Hill, J., and that the order appealed from must be set
aside and the decision of the learned judge reversed \Vith costs
here and below. I confine my judgment to the particular part
of the Channel where this collision occurred and to a case where
no evidence of any effective occupation is given. (Ibid., p. 323.)
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Some members of the court, however, were of the opinion if a decision had been rendered without the statements
of the Attorney General, it would have followed the
OP.inion of Hill, J., from which appeal had been taken.
( Development of aerial rules.-It is not the intention
as evidenced by aerial rules at present accepted to grant
to aircraft in time of war the same freedom of movement as that granted nav~l vessels, but rather to restrict
the freedom of aircraft in neutral jurisdiction to a degree
more nearly approximating that of military land material and personnel. A compromise has been generally
accepted 'vhich permits military aircraft to enter neutral
jurisdiction when upon and remaining on board vessels
of 'var if vessels of war themselves are permitted to
enter.
Previous to 1914 and even during the early days of
the 'Vor ld "\Var there had been proposals to limit belligerent activities to land and sea and to prohibit by international agreement in 'vhole or in part the use of aerial
space for warfare. This was to a degree accomplished by
'fhe Hague Convention of 1899 which for a period of
five years prohibited the launching of projectiles and explosives from aircraft. While by strict interpretation
the ter1ns of this convention ceased to be binding on the
belligerents during the Russo-Japanese War yet the two
belligerents mutually observed its provisions till the end
of the war. Before 1907 it became clear that the development of aerial navigation had made old rules obsolete. No formal and comprehensive rules existed in 1914
and the practice of the World War showed the need of
some regulations.
Submarines in 1916.-There had been in 1916 numerous rumors in regard to contemplated visits of submarines to American waters. The British Government
in a note of July 3, 1916, maintained that it was unlikely
that such a visit would be for any other purpose than
for conducting hostile operations, and set forth its ideas
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as to neutral duties.
that-

The Government further stated

The enemy subn1arines have been endeavoring for nearly 18
months to prey upon the Allied and neutral commerce, and
throughout that period enemy governments have never claimed
that their submarines were entitled to obtain supplies from
neutral ports. This must have been due to the fact that they
thought they would be met with a refusal and that hospitality
could not be claimed as of right. The difficulty of knowing
the movements or controlling the subsequent action of the submarines renders it impossible for the neutral to guard against
any breaches of neutrality after the submarine has left port and
justifies the neutral in drawing a distinction between surface
ships and submarines. The latter, it is thought, should be
treated on the same footing as seaplanes or other aircraft
and should not be allowed to enter neutral ports at all. This
is the rule prescribed during the present war by Norway and
Sweden. Another point of distinction between surface ships
and submarines should be borne in mind. A surface vessel demanding the hospitality of a neutral port runs certain inevitable
risks; its whereabouts become known and an enemy cruiser can
await its departure from port. This and similar facts put a
check on the above by belligerent surface ships of neutral hospitality. No such disadvantages limit the use to which the
Germans might put neutral ports as bases of supplies for
submarine raiders.
For these reasons, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government,
if any enemy submarine attempts to enter a neutral port, permis·
sion should be refused by the authorities. If the submarine
enters it should be interned unless it has been driven into port
by necessity. In the latter case it should be allowed to depart
as soon as necessity is at an end. In no circumstances should
it be allowed to obtain supplies.
If a submarine should enter a neutral port flying the mercantile flag Hi~ Majesty's Government are of opinion that it
is the duty of the neutral authorities concerned to enquire closely
into its right to fly that flag, to inspect the vessel thoroughly
and, in the event of torpedoes, torpedo tubes or guns being found
on board, to refuse to recognise it as a merchant ship.
In bringing the above to your serious consideration I have the
honor to express the confident hope that the United States Government will feel able to agree in the views of His Majesty's
Government and to treat submarine vessels of belligerent powers

THE ' 'DEUTSCHLAND' '

visiting United States ports accordingly.
tions, Supplement, p. 766.)
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'Vhen the submarine Deutschland arrived in Baltimore on July 9, 1916, with a cargo o£ dyestuffs, it was
advisedly treated by the United States as a merchant
vessel. The British Government pointed out the dangers o£ this action.
British position.-By a telegram o£ the British Secretary o:£ State :£or Foreign Affairs to the British ainbassador at Washington, July 18, 1916, the British position was further set forth in consequence o£ the treatment o:£ the Deutschland.
Fron1 point of view of sea po\ver so much depends both now
and in the future upon the way in which submarines are to
be treated in international law that it see1ns impossible to
leave the controversy at the stage where the United States
Government are disposed to let it rest.
The first point to be established is that international law ought
not to transfer without modification to submarines, rules and
regulations which work fairly well as regards surface vessels.
If this be once conceded we 1nay hope to have an international
code drawn up which might meet conditions of naval warfare.
It is argued that German commercial submarine carries cargo
but no armament and that it should therefore be treated exactly
like any other ship which carries cargo but not armament.
On this it must be observed that most formidable part of submarine, namely, its submersibility, is one of its inseparable attributes. Whatever else it carries and for whatever purpose it
may nominally have been designed, it cannot divest itself of its
most dangerous characteristic. If a belligerent were to use for
mercantile purposes a vessel which in every respect was designed
and armoured as a battle cruiser, but which carried no guns,
everybody would say: "This is only colourably a merchant ship;
nine-tenths of work required to convert her into a completely
equipped ship of war of most formidable type has already been
put into her and cannot be removed. Clearly it is as ship of war
that she should be treated."
So it is with the submarine. It is not torpedoes and torpedo
tubes which make her what she is. These are weapons which
may equally be possessed by a trawler. What really puts her in
a class apart and makes it necessary to treat her under special
138120-32--6
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rules is the indefeasible quality 'vhich she possesses of travelling
under water. She bears no real resemblance to a liner 'vhich in
time of 'var may have a few guns put into her and be turned
into an auxiliary cruiser but can never be made a powerful fighting unit. The submersible cargo boat, for all her peaceful appearance, possesses and must always possess qualities \vhich
would enable her at. very short notice to be converted into a
fighting vessel of most forinidable kind; her case is therefore
exceptional and calls for exceptional treatment.
If this be denied it 'vould seem to follow that unarmed submarines might be constructed in any number in neutral countries
and then be armed by belligerent purchaser with necessary
torpedo tubes. To take an example, Great Britain 'vould then,
if Germany and the United States ·were at war, be compelled to
supply Germany with submarines to be subsequently used in
destroying Anglo-American trade. (Ibid., p. 769.)

Allied attitude on submarines, 1916.-Identic memoranda were sent to the Department of State of the
United States by the French, British, Russian, J apanese, Italian, and Portuguese Governments in August,
1916, as follows :
In view of the development of submarine navigation, and by
reason" of the acts 'vhich, in present circumstances, may unfortunately be expected from enemy submarines, the Allied Governments consider it necessary, in order not only to safeguard
their belligerent rights and the liberty of commercial navigation, but to avoid risks of dispute, to urge neutral governments
to take effective measures, if they have not already done so,
with a view to preventing belligerent submarine vessels, whatever the purpose to which they are put, from making use of
neutral waters, roadsteads, and ports.
In the case of submarine vessels, the application of the principles of the la'v of nations is affected by special and novel
conditions; first, by the fact that these vessels can navigate
and remain at sea submerged, and can thus escape all control
and observation; and second, by the fact that it is impossible
to. identify them and to establish their national character,
whether neutral or belligerent, combatant or noncombatant, and
to remove the capacity for harm inherent in the nature of such
vessels.
It may further be said that any place which provides a sub·
marine warship far from its base with opportunity for rest and
replenishment of its supplies thereby furnishes such an addi-
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tion to its po\vers that the place becomes in fact, through the
advantages which it gives, a base of naval operations.
In view of the state of affairs thus existing, the Allied Governments are of opinion thatSubmarine vessels should be excluded from the benefit of the
rules hitherto recognized by the law of nations regarding the
admission of vessels of war or merchant vessels into neutral
waters, roadsteads, or ports, and their sojourn in them.
Any belligerent submarine entering a neutral port should be
detained there.
The Allied Governments take this opportunity to point out to
neutral powers the grave danger incurred by neutral submarines
in navigating regions frequented by belligerent submarines.
(1916, Foreign Relations, Supplement, p. 769.)

Reply of United States.-After reviewing the memo-randum of the Allied Powers, the Department of State
said on August 31, 1916, thatIn the opinion of the Government of the United States the
Allied powers have not set forth any circumstances, nor is the
Governtnent of the United States at present aware of any circutnstances, concerning the use of war or merchant submarines
which would render the existing rules of international law inapplicable to then1. In view of this fact and of the notice and
warning of the Allied powers announced in their memoranda
under acknowledgment, it is incumbent upon the Government of
the United States to notify the Governments of France, Great
Britain, Russia, and Japan that, so far as the treatment of either
war or merchant submarines in Atnerican waters is concerned,
the Government of the United States reserves its liberty of action
in all respects and will treat such vessels as, in its opinion, becomes the action of a power which may be said to have taken
the first steps toward establishing the principles of neutrality and
which for over a century has maintained those principles in the
traditional spirit and with the high sense of impartiality in
which they were conceived.
In order, however, that there should be no misunderstanding
as to the attitude of the United States, the Government of the
United States announces to the Allied powers that it holds it to
be the duty of belligerent powers to distinguish between submarines of neutral and belligerent nationality, and that responsibility for any conflict that may arise between belligerent warships
and neutral submarines on account of the neglect of a belligerent
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to so distinguish between these classes of submarines must rest
entirely upon the negligent power." (Ibid., p. 771.)

The Nether lands Government took a position similar
to that o£ the United States on the Allied 1neinorandu1n.
The Norwegian and other governments forbade the entrance o£ submarines except on surface and flying national flag. The regulations were changed £ro1n time to
time.
Disregard of neutral obligations.-According to article 1 o£ XIII Hague Convention respecting the rights
and duties o£ neutral powers in maritime war:
Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign rights of neutral
Powers and to abstain, in neutral territory or neutral 'vaters,
from any act which would, if knowingly permitted by any Power,
constitute a nonfulfillment of neutrality.

The use o£ neutral "\Vaters £or warlike purposes would
be in violation o£ the law o£ nearly all 1naritime states.
It is a right o£ the neutral that neutral territory be
respected. This right does not necessarily imply that the
rights o£ belligerents as regards each other v\"·ould be
entirely changed by the £act o£ their presence in neutral
waters. Belligerents have often acted against each other
in neutral waters. The arguments in support o£ such
acts have varied.
Violations of neutrality .-Sometimes there has been
violation o£ neutral jurisdiction without intention or
know ledge on the part o£ the actor. Before the principie o£ internment was generally recognized, the violation o£ neutral n1aritime jurisdiction was often argued
to have been necessary as an act o£ self-defense because
otherwise an ene1ny might take advantage o£ a sojourn
in a neutral port to strengthen his forces in a 1nanner
not recognized as within the neutral's power to prevent.
'fhere were cases, particularly prior to the Russo-J apanese War 1904-1905, when internment becan1e quite a
general practice which shows that belligerents took nlatters into their own hands.
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Acts in marginal sea.-Some have proposed to allow
in the marginal sea acts which are not directly hostile
in their nature. Such acts might be illustrated by the
:fueling or provisioning o:£ a belligerent ship. Those
who. 'vould allow such acts 'vould :forbid positive hostilities as the exercise o:£ the right o:£ visit or capture and o:£
course actual firing upon the enemy. N eutraljty which
would permit the :fueling o:£ belligerent :forces in neutral
waters without restriction would hardly meet the requirements o:£ modern standards. A belligerent :force
taking on :fuel outside o:£ neutral waters would be liable
to attack :from the opposing :forces and would have to
protect itself accordingly. Within neutral waters where
hostilities bet,veen the belligerents are :forbidden :fueling
1night go on almost as in time o:£ peace. The taking on
o:£ the supply o:£ :fuel permitted under the rules o:£ neutrality has in general the limitation that it is permitted
in order to enable the sh{p to keep the sea. The proposition o:f son1e o:f the advocates o:£ the doctrine which
would allow :fueling at any time . without restriction
within neutral waters beyond the port limits would uphold action on the part o:f a belligerent which in effect
constitutes the neutral waters a base. Colliers and :fuel
ships might await in safety in neutral waters the arrival o:£ a fleet and the fleet might return repeatedly :for
:fueling.
It is admitted that a neutral could not ordinarily and
should not be required to exercise the same measures
to prevent violations o:£ neutrality in remote marginal
seas and in ports. The supervision should be such as
could reasonably be exercised without unduly throwing
the burdens o:£ war on the neutral.
The action o:£ a belligerent in using neutral jurisdiction :for carrying on move1nents or undertakings which
are o:£ hostile nature is contrary to the obligations owed
by the belligerent to the neutral state. It is the aim
o:£ the first article o:£ The Hague Convention XIII to prohibit such conduct. The responsibility is placed upon the
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belligerent to abstain fro1n acts \vhich kno\vingly permitted by a neutral state \vould constitute a nonfulfillment of their neutrality. The nature of the obligation
may be seen from the comment in the report upon this
Article I submitted at The Hague Conference in 1907.
Le principe est applicable a la guerre continentale comme a
la guerre maritime, et il ne faut pas s'etonner que le Reglement
elabore par la Deuxieme Commission au sujet des droits et des
devoirs des Etats neutres sur terre commence par cette disposition: "Le territoire des Etats neutres est inviolable."
D'une n1aniere generale, les belligerants doivent s'abstenir dans
les eaux neutres de tout acte qui, s'il etait tolere par l'Etat
neutre, constituerait un manquement a la neutralite. II importe
de remarqQer, d€s a present, qu'un devoir du neutre ne
correspond pas necessairement a un devoir du belligerant et
cela est confor1ne a la nature des choses. On peut imposes au
belligerant !'obligation absolue de s'abstenir de certains actes
dans les eaux de l'Etat neutre; il lui est aise, et, dans tous les
cas, possible de satisfaire a cette ,obligation, qu'il s'agisse des
ports ou des eaux territoriales. On ne peut, au contraire,
imposer a l'Etat neutre !'obligation de prevenir ou de reprimer
tous les actes que voudrait faire ou ferait un belligerant, parce
que tres souvent l'Etat neutre ne sera pas en situation de
remplir une pareille obligation. II peut ne pas savoir tout ce
qui se passe dans ses eaux et il peut n'etre pas en etat de
l'empecher. Le devoir n'existe que dans la mesure ou on peut le
connaitre et le remplir. Cette observation re~oit son application
dans un certain nombre de cas.
On a parfo·s a se demander s'il y a lieu de distinguer entre les
ports et les ea ux territoriales : la distinction se co1nprend en ce
qui concerne les devoirs du neutre, qui ne peut etre au meme degre
responsable de se qui se- passe dans les ports soumis a ·!'action
directe de ses il;Utories ou dans ses eaux territoriales, sur lesquelles
il n'a souvent qu'un faible contrOle; la d~stinction ne se comprend
pas pour 1e devoir du belligerant, qui est le meme partout.
(Deuxien1e Conference de la Paix, Tome I, p. 297.)

Opinion of lJfr. Adams on 81tpply of coal.-The opinion of Mr. Charles Francis Adams before the Geneva
Arbitration Tribunal covered the general subject of supply of coal. 'fhe principles enun(l.iated may for the most
part apply to the supply of any kind of fuel. As the
summary presented by Mr. Adams covers various phases
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of the question of use of base for supplies, it may be some·what fully presented:
This question of coals was little considered by writers on the
law of nations, and by sovereign powers, until the present century. It has become one of the first importance, now that the
motive-power of all vessels is so greatly enhanced by it.
The effect of this application of steam-power has changed the
character of war on the ocean, and invested with a greatly preponderant force those nations which possess most largely the
best material for it within their own territories, and the greatest
nu1nber of maritime places over the globe where deposits may
be conveniently provided for their use.
It is needless to point out the superiority in this respect of the
position of Great Britain. There seems no way of discussing the
question other than through this example. Just in proportion to
these advantages is the responsibility of that country when holding the situation of a neutral in time of war.
The safest course in any critical e1nergency would be to deny
altogether to supply the vessels of any of the belligerents, except
perhaps when in positive distress.
But such a policy would not fail to be regarded as selfish, illiberal, and unkind by all belligerents. It \Vould inevitably lead
to the acquisition and establishment of similar positions for themselves by other maritime powers, to be guarded with equal exclusiveness, and entailing upon them enormous and continual
expenses to provide against rare emergencies.
It is not therefore either just or in the interest of other powers,
by exacting severe responsibilities of Great Britain in time of
war, to force her either to deny all supplies, or, as a lighter risk,
to engage herself in war.
It is in this sense that I approach the arguments that have
been presented in regard to the supply of coals given by Great
Britain to the insurgent American steamers as forming a base of
operations.
It must be noted that, throughout the war of four years, supplies of coal were furnished liberally at first, and more scantily
afterward, but still indiscriminately, to both belligerents.
The difficulty is obvious how to distinguish those cases of coals
given to either of the parties as helping them impartially to other
ports, from those furnished as a base of hostile operations.
Unquestionably, Commodore Wilkes, in the Vanderbilt, was very
much aided in continuing his cruise at sea by the supplies obtained from British sources. Is this to be construed as getting a
base of operations?
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It is plain that a line must be drawn somewhere, or else no
neutral power will consent to furnish supplies to any belligerent
whatever in time of war.
So far as I am able to find my way out of this dilemma, it is in
this wise:
The supply of coals to a belligerent involves no responsibility
to the neutral, when it is made in response to a demand presented in good faith, with a single object of satisfying a legitimate purpose openly assigned.
On the other hand, the same supply does involve a responsibility if it shall in any way be made to appear that the concession
was made, either tacitly or by agreement, with a view to promote
or complete the execution of a hostile aret.
Hence I perceive no other way to determine the degree of the
responsibility of a neutral in these cas~s, than by an exa,mination of the evidence to show the intent -of the grant in any specific case. Fraud or falsehood in such a case poisons everything
it touches. Even indifference may degenerate into willful negligence, and that will impose a burden of proof to excuse it before
responsibility can be relieved.
This is the rule I have endeavored to apply in judging the
nature of the cases complained of in the course of this arbitration. (Papers relating to the treaty of Washington, vol. 4, p.
148.)

Opinion of Sir Alexande"r Oockburn.-The position o£
Mr. Adams was criticised by one o£ the British representatives, sitting on the tribunal. He said:
But a novel and, to my mind, most extraordinary proposition is
now put forward, namely, that if a belligerent ship is allo,ved to
take coal, and then to go on its business as a ship of \Var, this is
to make the port from which the coal is procured " a base of
naval operations," so as to come within the prohibition of the
second rule of the treaty of Washington.
\Ve have here another instance of an attmnpt to force the
words of the treaty to a meaning which they were never-at least
so far as one of the contracting parties is concerned-intended to
bear. It would be absurd to suppose that the British governInent, in assenting to the rule as laid down, intended to a(hnit
that whenever a ship of 'var had taken in coal at a British
port and then gone to sea again as a war-vessel, a liability for all
. the mischief done by her should ensue. Nor can I believe that
the United States Government had any such a7Tiere pensee in
fran1ing the rule; as, if such had been the case, it is impossible
to suppose that they would not have distinctly informed the
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Briti sh goYernment of the extended application they proposed to
give to the rule.
The rule of international law, that a belligerent shall not
n1ake neutra~ territory the base of hostile operations, is founded
on the principle that the neutral territory is inviolable by the
belligerent, and that it is the duty of the neutral not to allow
his territory to be used by one belligerent as a starting-point for
operations against the other. This is nowh~re better explained,
as regards ships of war, than by 1\1. Ortolan, in the following
passage:
"Le principe general de l'inviolabilite du territoire neutre exige
aussi que l'emploi de ce territoire reste franc de toute 1nesure
ou moyen de guerre, de l'un des. belligerants contre l'autre.
C'est une obligation pour chacun des belligerants de s'en abstenir;
c'est aussi un devoir pour l'etat neutre d'exiger cette abstention;
et c'est aussi pour lui un devoir d'y veiller et d'en maintenir
!'observation a l'encontre de qui que ce soit. Ainsi il appartient
a l'autotite qui commande dans les lieux neutres, ou des navires
belligerants, soit de guerre, soit de commerce, ont ete re~us, de
prendre des mesures necessaires pour que l'asile accorde ne tourne
pas en machination hostile contre l'un des belligerants; pour
empecher specialement qu'il ne devienne un lieu d'ou les batiJnents de guerre ou les corsaires surveillent les navires ennemis
pour les poursuivre et les combattre, et les capturer lorsqu'ils
seront parvenus au-delii. de la mer territoriale. Une de ces
mesures consiste a e1npecher la sortie simultanee des navires
appurtenant a des puissances ennemies l'une de l'autre.1 "
It must be, I think, plain that the words "base of operations"
must be accepted in their ordinary and accustomed sense, as
they have hitherto been understood, both in common parlance
and among authors who have written on international law.
Now, the term "base of warlike operations" is a military term,
and has a well-known sense. It signifies a local position which
serves as a point of departure and return in military operations,
and with which a constant connection and communication can
be kept up, and which may be fallen back upon whenever necessary. In naval warfare it would mean something analogousa port or water from which a fleet or a ship of war might watch
an enemy and sally forth to attack him, with the possibility of
falling back upon the port or water in question, for fresh supplies
or shelter, or a renewal of operations. (Papers relating to treaty
of "\Vashington, vol. 4, p. 422.)
1

Diplomatie de la mer, vol. i, p. 291.

,
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Later speaking of the supply of coal the Shenandoah
'vas allo,ved to take in ~1elbourne, Sir Alexander Cockburn said:
But it is said that by taking in coal at 1\Ielbourne, with the
ulterior purpose of making \Var on the whaling vessels of the
United States, this vessel \Vas enabled to make the port of 1\Ielbourne a "base of naval operations."
As I have already observed, when the la\v on this subject \vas
under discussion, the application of such a rule in favor of
the United States to the prejudice of Great Britain would be a
flagrant injustice, seeing that, as I then showed, ships of \var
of the United States obtained. many thousand tons of coal, under
exactly the same circumstances, that is to say, \Vhen they had
particular "naYal operations" in immediate view. If this doctrine is to hold, every time a vessel, having a particular belligerent purpose in vie,v, takes in coal, and proceeds on such purpose,
the port will at once be converted into a base of naval operations.
The same reasoning \Vould of course apply, and in the same degree,
to repairs.
This proposition is, to 1ny n1ind, utterly unreasonable, as being
altogether inconsistent \Yith any idea that ever has been. or
properly can be, attached to the term "base of operations;" and
is, moreoYer, in the most flagrant degree unjust, if it is to have
the effect of imposing on the neutral any responsibility to the
other belligerent. For it is obviously inconsistent with comn1on
justice that the neutral state shall suffer for that to which it is
not only no party, but of which it bas also no knowledge. By the
common practice of nations, as well as by the regulations of the
government, a belligerent vessel is allowed to haYe the benefit of
necessary repairs, and to take a supply of coal without the local
government being entitled to inquire into her ulterior destination.
No such inquiry is prescribed by the regulations in question, or
by those made by any other nation; nor has any publicist ever suggested that such a proceeding should be adopted. No such inquiry
could, with propriety, be made; nor could the commander of the
ship be called upon to answer it if made. The knowledge of his
intended course might expose hiln to the attack of an enen1y.
No such question, so far as I a1n aware, \Vas ever put to a belligerent vessel during the whole course of the war. None such was
ever put to a ship of the United States when applying for coal at
a British port. This being so, to say that, the local goYernn1ent
being in ignorance of the destination of the vessel, a responsibility is to be incurred because the belligerent, in obtaining this
accommodation, has an ulterior operation in view, as to which, by
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some violent distortion of language, the port 1nay be said to be thus
rendered a base, but of which ulterior operation the neutral
knows nothing, a}1pears to me to be an outrage not only of the
first principles of justice, but also upon the plainest dictates of
common sense. (Ibid., p. 498.)

Consideration in 1912.-The Naval "\Var College considered the question of base 'vith particular reference
to coaling in the conferences of 1912. It 'vas stated that

under the circun1stances specified where one belligerent
govern1nent protests against furnishing coal to naval
colliers of the opponent in a neutral port, the neutral
state should heed the request. In this case it was kno,vn
that such coal had been furnished and the protest was
against the continuance of the practice. In referring to
the conception of base under such circumstances it was
said:
The word " base " had been used in many senses. It is often
couvled with some other word which 1nodifies its meaning. The
1nost common exr1ression is "base of con1n1unications," though
" base of supplies," " base of cominunications " and other expressions are used. The Inodifying words are differently interpreted.
The use of neutral territory by a belligerent as a base in the
sense of a place in which a belligerent 1nay habitually prepare to
wage war n1ore effectiyely against his enemy, fit out expeditions,
take refuge, or establish a rendezvous. is usually regarded as contrary to, or a violation of neutrality. The Hague Convention rela1ive to the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Maritime 'Var
proYides at the outset that the belligerent shall not tlH6W all
obligation upon the neutral, saying:
"Article I. Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign
rights of neutral powers and to abstain, in neutral territory or
neutral waters, from any act which would, if knowingly perInitted by any power, constitute a nonfulfillment of neutrality."
(1912, Naval 'Var College, International Law Situations, p. 153.)

Danish order, 1912.-In the Danish order of December 20, 1912, there were provisions 'vhich were quite in
detail in regard to the use by belligerents of national
'vaters. Even the possibility of the establishing of fuel

depots in Danish 'vaters was foreseen. In part 4, paragraph 2, it 'vas provided:
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It is prohibited to organize fuel depots on Danish territory or
on vessels staying in Danish territorial \Vaters. '(1916, Naval
\Var College, International La'v Topics, p. 52.)

Opinion of Professor Holland.-Professor Holland of
Oxford University, in 1913, president of the Institute
of International Law, wrote during the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904-5 in regard to furnishing coal to the Russian fleet. He mentions that ordinary commerce between neutrals and belligerents is not terminated by war,
and that this commerce even in articles of contraband
may be subject only to the risks of war. He further says:
It by no means follows that British shipowners may charter
their vessels "for such purposes as following the Russian fleet
with coal supplies." Lord Lansdo·wne's recent letter to 1\Iessrs.
"\Voods, Taylor and Brown is explicit to the effect that such conduct is " not permissible." Lord Lansdowne naturally confined
himself to answering the question which had been addressed by
those gentlemen to the Foreign Office; but the reason for his
answer is not far to seek. The unlawfulness of chartering British
vessels for the purpose above mentioned is \vholly unconnected
with the doctrine of contraband, but is a consequence of the international duty, \Vhich is incumbent on every neutral State, of
seeing that its territory is not made a base of belligerent operations. The question was thoroughly threshed out as long ago as
1870, when l\Ir. Gladstone said in the House of Commons that
the Government had adopted the opinion of the law officers" That if colliers are chartered for the purpose of attending
the fleet of a belligerent and supplying it \Vith coal, to enable
it to pursue its hostile operations, such colliers \Vould, to all
practical purposes, become store-ships to the fleet, and would be
liable, if within reach, to the operation of the English law under
the (old) Foreign Enlistment Act."
British colliers attendant on a Russian fleet \Vould be so undeniably aiding and abetting the operations of that fleet as to
give just cause of complaint against us to the Government of
Japan. The British shipper of coal to a belligerent fleet at sea,
besides thus laying his Government open to a charge of neglect of
an international duty, lays himself open to criminal proceedings
under the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870. By section 8 (3) and
( 4) of that Act, " any person within H. M. Dominions " who
(subject to certain exceptions) equips or despatches any ship, with
intent, or knowledge, that the same \Vill be employed in the
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military or naval service of a foreign State, at war with any
friendly State, is liable to fine or imprisonment, and to the forfeiture of the ship. By section 30, "naval service" covers "user
as a store-ship," and "equipping" covers furnishing a ship with
" stores or any other thing which is used in or about a ship for
the purpose of adapting her for naval service." Our Government
has, therefore, ample powers for restraining, in this respect, the
use of its territory as a base. It has no power, had it the wish
(except for its own protection, under a different statute), to
restrain the export of contraband of war.
It would tend to clearness of thought if the term "contraband"
were never emplo~'ed in discussions with reference to prohibition
of the supply of ·coal to a belligerent fleet at sea. (Letters on
'Var and Neutrality, p. 93.)

Award of the t1'ibunal.-The a'vard of the Geneva
Tribunal referring to coaling stated that "in order to
impart to any supplies of coal a character inconsistent
'vith the second rule, prohibiting the use of neutral ports
or waters, as a base of naval operations for a belligerent,
it is necessary that the said supplies should be connected
with special circumstances of time, of persons, or of
place, which may combine to give them such character."
( 1 Moore, International Arbitrations, p. 574.)
Restatement of rule.-The rule of the treaty of Washington, 1871, in regard to the use of a neutral port or
waters as a base of operations was restated in the
American case as follows :
The second Rule provides that a neutral government is bound
not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its
ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other,
or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military
supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men.
A question has been raised whether this rule is understood
to apply to the sale of military supplies or arms in the ordinary
course of commerce. The United States do not understand that
it is intended to apply to such a traffic. They understand it to
apply to the use of a neutral port by a belligerent for the renewal or augmentation of such n1ilitary supplies or anns for the
naval operations referred to in the rule. Taken in this sense,
the United States maintain that the same obligations are to be
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found, (expressed in other words,) first, in the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819; and, secondly, in the instructions to the na Yal
forces of Great Britain during the rebellion.
The Tribunal of Arbitration will not fail to observe the breadth
of this rule.
The ports of waters of the neutral are not to be made the base
of naval operations by a belligerent. Vessels of war may come
and go under such rules and regulations as the neutral may preS<;!ribe; food and the ordinary stores and supplies of a ship, not of
a warlike character, may be furnished without question, in quantities necessary for immediate wants; the moderate hospitalities
which do not infringe upon impartiality may be extended; but no
act shall be done to make the neutral port a base of operations.
Ammunition and military stores for ,cruisers cannot be obtained
there; coal cannot be stored there for successive supplies to the
same vessel, nor can it be furnished or obtained in such supplies;
prizes cannot be brought there for condemnation. The repairs
that humanity demand can be given, but no repairs should add to
the strength or efficiency of a vessel, beyond what is absolutely
necessary to gain the nearest of its own ports.
In the same sense are to be taken the clauses relating to the
renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms and the
recruitment of men. As the vessel enters the port, so is she to
leave it, without addition to her effective power of doing injury
to the other belligerent. If her magazine is supplied with powder,
shot, or shells; if new guns are added to her armament; if pistols,
or muskets, or cutlasses, or other implements of destruction, are
put on board; if men are recruited; even if, in these days when
steam is a power, an excessive supply of coal is put into her
bunkers, the neutral will have failed in the performance of its
duty. (1, Papers, treaty of Washington, p. 70.)

Supplies.-In the discussions during the Geneva Arbitration there were many claims and counterclain1s.
The United States (thought) thatBritish territory was, during the whole struggle, the base of
the naval operations of the insurgents. The first serious fight
hud scarcely taken place before the contracts were made in Great
Britain for the Alabama and the Florida. The contest was nearly
over when Waddell received his orders in Liverpool to sail thence
in the Lau.reZ in order to take command of the Shenandoah and to
visit the Arctic Ocean on a hostile cruise.
There also was the arsenal of the insurgents, from whence they
drew their munitions of war, their arms, and their supplies. It
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is true that it has been said, and may again be said, that it was
no infraction of the law of nations to furnish such supplies. But,
while it is not tnaintained that belligerents n1ay infringe upon
the rights which neutrals hav~ to manufacture and deal in such
military supplies in the ordinary course of cmnmerce, it is asserted with confidence that a neutral ought not to permit a belligerent to use the neutral soil as the main if not the only base of
its military supplies, during a long and bloody contest, as the
soil of Great Britain was used by the insurgents. (1, Papers
relating to the treaty of 'Vashington, p. 125.)

British 1?eply.-To the statement made by the United
States as to the interpretation o£ the second rule o£ the
treaty o£ "\Vashington the British countercase makes
reply:
·
According to this interpretation a neutral goYernment which
should suffer a belligerent cruiser to effect repairs beyond what
are absolutely necessary for gaining the nearest of its own ports,
or to receive more coal than \vould be enough for the same purpose, would commit a breach of neutral duty. It n1ay, indeed,
sometimes be found convenient by neutral powers to in1pose restrictions of this nature, n1ore or less stringent, on the armed vessels of belligerents adtnitted into their ports; and this was done
by Great Britain during the civil war. But such restrictions were
not then, and are not no\v, dictated by any rule of international
obligation. 'Vere they to become such, and \vere the obligation
to be construed against the neutral with the breadth and rigor
for \Vhich the United States contend, it may be feared that neutral powers would rarely be secure against complaints and demands for compensation on the part of one . belligerent or
another.
Having constantly during the war used British ports as places
of resort for its own cruisers, and having repeatedly obtained for
them therein successive supplies of coal, \Vhich were consumed, not
in returning home, but in cruising, the Government of the United
States no\v appears to represent this very act as a breach o.f
neutral duty, and to hold Great Britain liable for any cases in
which confederate vessels may have succeeded in obtaining similar facilities.
This question, however, does not regard Great Britain alone.
The Government of the United States has plainly declared that
it regards these rules as no more than a statement of previously
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established rules of international law.2 So far as regar(ls the
fecond rule I-Ier Britannic l\1ajesty's government concurs in th:s
view. The expressions upon which the United States rely belong
to a class in common use among publicists, who, in attempting
to define the duties of neutrality, are accustomed to en1ploy these
'vords or others equivalent to them, and of not less extensive
Ineaning. Thus the phrase, "base of naval operations," employed in this connection, denot~s the use of neutral territory by
a belligerent ship as a station or point of departure, 'vhere she
may await and from whence she may attack her enemy. That
these expressions have not hitherto received the construction
which the United States ·would put upon them is certain. 'Vhether
they are to receive it in future is a question which concerns not
Great Britain only, but all other powers which may hereafter find
themselves neutral in maritime warfare. (Two papers, treaty of
Washington, p. 221.)

Self-defense, the "Oaroline."-In 1841, Mr. Webster,
Secretary o:f State, in a communication to Mr. Fox,
British Minister, said:
It is admitted that a just right of self-defence attaches always
to nations as 'vell as to individuals, and is equally necessary
for the preservation of both. But the extent of this right is a
question to be judged of by the circumstances of each particular
case; and when its alleged exercise has led to the commission of
hostile acts within the territory of a power at peace, nothing less
than a clear and absolute necessity can afford ground of justification. (6, Webster's vVorks, p. 255.)

Further, referring to the destruction o:f the 0 aroline
by the British, Mr. Webster said :
It will be for that government to show a necessity of selfdefence, instant, over,vhelming, leaving no choice of means, and
no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to show, also, that
the local authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of
the moment authorized the1n to enter the territories of the
United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since
the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited
by that necessity, and kept clearly within it. (Ibid., p. 261.)
2
Case of the United States, pp. 148, 149. See also p. 162,. and the
President's message to Congress, Dec. 4, 1871. "The contracting parties in
the treaty have undel'ltaken to regard as between themselves certain principles of public law, for which the United States have contended from the
commencement of their history. They have also agreed to bring those
principles to the knowledge of the other maritime powers, and to invite
them to accede to them."
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"'\'Thile l\Ir. 'Vebster's position in 184± is taken as a
correct state1nent of the la 'v, the strain of 'var has put it
to seYere test. Naturally 'vriters in belligerent countries
during and in11nediately after the "'\iV orld War were disposed to find reasons for supporting acts of their national
or allied forces. This 'vas often Inani:fest in regard to
the attitude to,vard ne'v agencies of 'varfare such as the
sub1narine and aircraft, but·the principles of la'v are not
dependent upon the agencies as has been shown fron1
early times 'vhen new :forn1s o:f 'vea pons 'vere vie·w·ed
'vith disfavor or even prohibited. The early object o:f
'"ar to conquer the ene1ny 'vas gradually superseded by
the object of bringing the enemy to tern1s, and later to
bring the enen1y to terms 'vith the least loss of life and
property, and then to bring the enemy to terms 'vith the
least loss of life and property 'vithout unnecessary
suffering.
/:.:elf-defense, general.-As a basis of international la'v
the right of states to exist is ackno,vledgecl. A state 1nust
therefore have the right to defend its existence. In defending its existence, it must recognize the right of other
states to exist. As bet,veen belligerents in time o:f war
this Inutual recognition of the right of existence is tenlporarily suspended except as involved in conduct conforinable to the la,vs of w·ar. The existence of 'var
should not, ho,vev·er, iinperil the existence of states 'vhich
are neutral and not parties to the 'var. That neutral
states 1nay be inconvenienced by war is entirely possible
and that neutral and belligerent rights may at ti1nes be
in conflict is also possible. This is recognized in the interference 'vith conunerce as in blockade, contraband
.
'
and other admitted 'var practices.
Quite different is an act of vvar 'vithin neutral jurisdiction. Such acts are prohibited because a neutral n1ay
be responsible for acts which take place within its jurisdiction, and in recent years it has been held that a neutral state is bound to use due diligence to prevent such
138120-3~--7
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acts. Due diligence has been interpreted as the use of
the 1neans at the disposal of the neutral state.
If in the presence of an adequate neutral force of a
coastal state, a 1nuch inferior belligerent force should be
per1nitted to attack or to capture in the neutral jurisdiction an opponent's merchant vessel, the neutral's duty
'vould not be fulfilled. If, hovvever, on a remote neutral
coast such an attack or capture should be made, the neutral obligation might be slight. In both cases the belligerent's obligation 'vould be the same. If a belligerent
submarine should suddenly appear in neutral waters in a
position which apparently immediately threatentd its
opponent's fleet, there might be a ground for action
against the submarine as in self-defense.
SOLUTION

(a) ( 1) The aircraft of X should not attack the subInarine of Y unless on grounds other than 1nere presence
of the sub1narine in the strait of R.
(2) 'rhe presence of the cruiser of State R vvould make
it n1ore imperative that any attack by the aircraft of X
upon the submarine of Y should be based upon son1e hostile act of the sub1narine of Y.
(b) State R should intern the vessels of State X if
they are or have been using the waters of R as a base.
0 onclusions.- (a) From practice of states and fron1
accepted rules at present (1) a belligerent is under obligation to refrain within neutral jurisdiction fro1n any
act 'vhich, if knowingly per1nitted by a neutral, "'rould be
a nonfulfillment of neutrality; (2) any 'varlike act.
against an enemy 'vithin neutral jurisdiction is a Yiolation of international law; (3) reparation for such an act
is due to the neutral state; (4) the netttral n1ay be under
obligation to the injured belligerent if due diligence has
not been used though; ( 5) the act 1nay be Yalid as.
bet·ween the belligerents.
As to Situation II it may be said that (a) ( 1) the sub-.
1narine of State Y is conforming to the general requireInent that submarines in neutral 'vaters navigate upon
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the surface. The aircraft of State X is flying within
neutral jurisdiction \vhich in general is contrary to neutrality. The sub1narine of Y if conforming to the laws
of R has the san1e right in the strait as the fleet of X.
'fhe fact that it is in a favorable position to attack the
fleet of X gives the force of X no right to attack the
submarine of Y nor does the submarine have any right
to attack the fleet of X.
(2) The fact that a cruiser of State R is near would
not change the relative rights of the belligerents, but
'vould be an evidence that State R proposed to maintain its neutrality and that the forces of X and Y \vere
to that degree more secure as regards each other.
(b) This land of State R consisting of islands not
1nore than 6 n1iles apart in the area in \vhich the vessels
of State X are refueling incloses open water 7 n1iles
fro1n any of the islands.
It has been generally held that such \Vater is analogous
to a bay and the surrounding state has over it exclusive
jurisdiction.
Consequently the refueling is taking place 'vithin the·
jurisdiction of State R.
The aircraft Y can not lawfully traverse the air above·
this area but if it makes its observation from the high_
seas, it con1mits no violation of R's neutrality and even
if it does, that in no 'vay changes the obligations of
StateR.
'fhe refueling to peace capacity of full bunkers not.
n1ore often than once in three months in a neutral port.
is usually permitted, but under supervision of port:
authorities .
.•:-\..t the point 7 miles from any land, the port authorities, if any, \vould not ordinarily be exercising superv-ision because the com1nercial vessel \Vould not have entered port and would not have deposited its papers.
The demand of the aircraft of State Y is correct, and
State R should intern the vessels of State X if they are
or have been using its waters as a base.

